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Abstract 
Individuals with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) symptoms often struggle with heightened 
sensitivity and arousal in response to perceived threats. Moreover, interpersonal dysfunction in 
GAD has become increasingly a focus of empirical investigation and treatment, given the 
possibility that responses to social interactions may contribute to GAD symptom maintenance. 
Laboratory studies and cross-sectional trait assessments of interpersonal problems comprise most 
of our understanding of interpersonal dysfunction in GAD. However, how GAD symptoms 
interact with perceived interpersonal threats to predict affective responses (increased arousal, 
lower valence) within daily life remains poorly understood. Therefore, the purpose of the present 
study was to examine effects of in vivo social perceptions on state affect, and how GAD 
symptoms may moderate those relationships. Participants (N = 161) completed baseline 
measures of trait GAD and depression symptoms (as a covariate). Then participants completed 
30 social interaction surveys over the subsequent 10 days. In each survey, participants rated 
interaction partners’ dominant, cold, and immoral behavior (each conceptualized as interpersonal 
threats) as well as their own arousal and valence in response to the behavior. Multilevel 
modeling analyses of between- and within-person effects revealed that mean perceptions of cold 
and immoral behavior predicted higher arousal and lower valence as hypothesized, whereas 
mean perceived dominance unexpectedly predicted only lower valence. All within-person 
fluctuations in social perceptions predicted both higher arousal and lower valence. Regarding the 
moderating effects, GAD symptoms unexpectedly buffered the effect of average perceived cold 
behavior on valence and strengthened the effect of average perceived immoral behavior on 




to affect in naturalistic interactions, and add to the literature on interpersonal correlates of GAD 
symptoms.  
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Introduction and Literature Review 
Overview 
The excessive and uncontrollable worry and hyperarousal symptoms of Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder (GAD) range from “normal” to pathological and contribute to distress and 
functional impairment in individuals of all ages. However, the current best interventions for 
treating GAD symptoms are only effective for about 50% of individuals at post-treatment 
follow-up (Hanrahan, Field, Jones, & Davey, 2013). As such, research on GAD symptoms has 
increasingly focused on better understanding underlying processes that may be targeted in 
treatment, such as biases toward perceived threats, affective reactivity, and specific domains of 
dysfunction, such as interpersonal relationships. However, scant research exists that examines 
dynamic state processes that explain trait GAD symptoms in the context of specific interpersonal 
interactions in daily life. The existing research in this area is limited by its focus on trait-level 
tendencies to explain trait GAD symptoms. Much less is known about variable, state-level, daily 
interpersonal processes in individuals with GAD symptoms, which may better explain how GAD 
symptoms are maintained over time.  
Whole Trait Theory (WTT; Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015) is a recently-developed 
theory which posits that understanding a ‘whole trait’ or individual difference variable – like 
GAD symptoms – is possible by examining it at both the stable, trait level and the variable, 
within-person state level. WTT asserts that there is an inseparable link between the broad 
description of a given trait and its varied expression across situations. For instance, having high 
levels of a trait such as neuroticism reflects both 1) a description of the person’s average level of 




person variability in the expressed level of negative emotional states, which may fluctuate 
around the person’s mean level response to characteristics of a given situation. Therefore, in the 
present investigation, better understanding how the state-level perception of threats and affective 
reactivity occur in daily interpersonal interactions will inform our understanding of trait GAD 
symptoms more broadly.  
The Interpersonal Circumplex (IPC; Wiggins, 1982), which conceptualizes social 
behaviors along dimensions of dominance (ranging from dominance to submission) and 
affiliation (ranging from close, socializing behavior to distancing behavior), provides a basic 
framework for considering interpersonal perceptions of threats in daily social interactions. These 
two dimensions appear to capture substantial variance in the domain of interpersonal behavior, 
permitting researchers to categorize behaviors and predict behaviors within social interactions 
(see Pincus & Ansell, 2003 for a review). However, recent theory and research suggests that it 
may be important to also examine a third social-cognitive or interpersonal dimension 
representing perceived morality, as this clearly contributes unique variability in perceptions of 
others’ behaviors (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014; Haidt, 2003; Haidt, 2006).  
In addition to circumplex descriptions of behavior, an individual’s affective reaction to 
another person’s interpersonal behavior helps us understand what meaning was ascribed to the 
other person’s behavior. For instance, negative affect and arousal are typically associated with 
the perception of threats (Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1982). Although GAD theory and 
research has assumed that negative social information represent threats (i.e., angry faces; Mogg, 
Millar, & Bradley, 2000; Verkuil et al., 2009), further research is needed to better understand 
how specific IPC behaviors may function as daily interpersonal threats to people with different 




perceptions of others’ behavior in terms of dominance, affiliation, and morality dimensions 
during social interactions may predict negative affect and arousal, as well as whether individuals 
high in GAD symptoms have stronger within-person associations between perceived social 
threats and affective response. Before describing the details of the present study, I will review 
relevant literatures on GAD, Whole Trait Theory, and the Interpersonal Circumplex.  
Background 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
Core Symptoms 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) is characterized by excessive and uncontrollable 
worry about several life domains (e.g., daily to-dos, finances, interpersonal relationships, health 
of family members; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). Worry is a cognitive 
process that involves repetitive thinking about anticipated negative events (Borkovec, Robinson, 
Pruzinksy, & DePree, 1983). The form of worry has been theorized to be primarily abstract 
verbal-linguistic cognitions (e.g., “What if my classmate rejects me?”; Borkovec, Alcaine, & 
Behar, 2004), but may also include mental imagery (e.g., mentally picturing being rejected by a 
classmate; Bergman & Craske, 2000; Skodzik et al., 2016). To receive a diagnosis of GAD, the 
dysfunctional worry needs to occur nearly every day over the course of six months and must be 
accompanied by at least three somatic symptoms that are associated with physiological arousal, 
including: restlessness or feeling keyed up or on edge, being easily fatigued, difficulty 
concentrating or mind going blank, irritability, muscle tension, and sleep disturbance (APA, 
2013). Thus, broadly speaking, GAD involves problems with negative anticipatory thinking that 





GAD Symptoms Are Prevalent and Disabling 
Regarding GAD symptom prevalence and disability, most of the available data are based 
on estimates from people with diagnosable GAD. Prevalence estimates suggest that 1.6% to 
5.0% of the population suffered from GAD over the past year (Kessler et al., 2005: Kessler, 
Keller, & Wittchen, 2001; Moffitt et al., 2010; Wittchen, Zhao, Kessler, & Eaton, 1994), and that 
an estimated 14.2% of people will develop GAD at some point in their life (Moffitt et al., 2010). 
Around 56% of individuals with GAD reported having severe disabilities (Kessler et al., 2009), 
37% relied on public assistance, and 50% lacked full-time employment (Massion et al., 1993). 
Having GAD has been associated with increased functional impairment over preceding 3 
months, increased number of physician visits, and decreased health-related quality of life (Dear 
et al., 2011). Furthermore, people with GAD tended to endorse lasting interpersonal conflicts 
(Judd et al., 1998), report low marital satisfaction (Whisman, 2007), were less likely to be 
married, experienced more life events and greater financial problems, and reported more 
disability and distress (Goncalves & Byrne, 2012). Gentes and Ruscio (2014) conducted a study 
that identified disabilities relevant to GAD symptoms, regardless of diagnostic status. They 
found that compared to individuals with non-distressing levels of worry, people with GAD and 
even worriers who did not meet full GAD criteria reported more disruptions in schoolwork, 
social life, family/home life, number of days lost and unproductivity due to worry symptoms. 
Thus, these individuals experience significant distress and dysfunction, particularly in the 
interpersonal domain. 
 Across psychiatric disorders, having comorbid diagnoses is often associated with 
increased distress and functional impairment (Williams & Egede, 2016), and GAD is frequently 




found to be comorbid with a mood or personality disorder in 89.8% of individuals over the past 
12 months (Grant et al., 2005), with Major Depressive Disorder or dysthymia (i.e., Persistent 
Depressive Disorder) in 36% of individuals (Brown, Campbell, Lehman, Grisham, & Mancill, 
2001), and with panic disorder and social anxiety disorder in 23% of individuals (Beesdo, Pine, 
Lieb, & Wittchen, 2010). Thus, individuals with GAD symptoms are prone to endorsing a range 
of other symptoms or comorbid disorders, suggesting further evidence of impairment. 
GAD Symptoms as Dimensional 
Although GAD is a formal diagnosis, GAD symptoms may be conceptualized as a 
dimensional, continuous variable rather than dichotomous factor (i.e., presence of GAD 
diagnosis or not). Despite evidence linking diagnosable GAD to impairment, its core cognitive 
features and symptoms occur on a broad spectrum. First, worry is a normative cognitive process 
(Ruscio, Borkovec, & Ruscio, 2001) engaged by people of all ages (Miloyan, Byrne, & Pachana, 
2014; Olatunji, Broman-Fulks, Bergman, Green & Zlomke, 2010; Wilson, 2010). Second, the 
more a person worries (even at subclinical levels), the more psychological distress they tend to 
experience (Goncalves & Byrne, 2012). Finally, having high levels of worry does not always 
mean that the person would meet full criteria for a formal diagnosis of GAD (Ruscio et al., 
2001). For instance, results of two taxometric analyses suggest that worry constitutes a single 
dimensional factor, rather than dichotomous factors that would otherwise distinguish “normal” 
from pathological worriers (Olatunji et al., 2010; Ruscio et al., 2001). Furthermore, in a sample 
of 3,486 worriers aged 18 to 98 years, about 987 (28.3%) of the participants met screening 
criteria for Generalized Anxiety Disorder (GAD) in the past 12 months (Miloyan, Byrne, & 
Pachana, 2014). However, researching only the individuals who surpassed the threshold for 




symptoms in general. Therefore, it seems prudent to measure GAD symptoms as a continuous 
variable to understand its linear relationship to other continuous variables and provide findings 
that are relevant to a wide variety of GAD symptomatology.  
Core Processes of GAD: Threat Sensitivity and Affective Reactivity  
Given the negative impact of trait-like GAD symptoms in people’s lives, it is important 
to understand core underlying processes that may be targets for psychological interventions. Two 
cognitive-affective processes that appear to be central to individuals high in GAD symptoms 
include: 1) a heightened sensitivity to perceiving threats (Goodwin, Yiend, & Hirsch, 2017; 
Hirsch & Mathews, 2012) and 2) tendencies to react to perceived threats with greater negative 
affect and arousal (Aldao, Mennin, Linardatos, & Fresco, 2010; Hoffman et al., 2005; Stapinski, 
Abbott, & Rapee, 2010). Threats may be defined as “any object, person or event (internal or 
external) that might endanger one’s physical health or psychological wellbeing” (Arnaudova et 
al., 2017, p. 4). These can include environmental threats (e.g., a cliff’s edge) or social threats 
(e.g., picture of an angry face; Dolan & Vuillemier, 2003; Monk et al., 2008; Sutherland, 
Oldmeadow, & Young, 2016). Furthermore, perceiving something as a threat means that the 
individual assumes a negative outcome is both probable and costly (Berenbaum, Thompson, & 
Bredemeier, 2007).  
Research has shown that people with GAD symptoms have heightened neurological 
sensitivities to perceiving threats (Stout, Shackman, Pedersen, Miskovich, & Larson, 2017) and 
sustained threat processing (Burkhouse, Woody, Owens, & Gibb, 2015), attentional biases 
toward threat (Goodwin et al., 2017b; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014), and tendencies to interpret 
neutral or ambiguous stimuli as threatening (Gole et al., 2012; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; 




sensitivity to interpersonal threats, such that higher symptoms may be associated with higher 
sensitivity.  
However, research on threat perception in GAD has been conducted almost entirely in 
laboratory settings in which participants were tested for their implicit and self-reported reactions 
to negatively-valenced stimuli (e.g., Stapinski et al., 2010; Zainal & Newman, 2017). Only two 
studies were found that examined the effect of GAD symptoms on naturalistic, daily reports of 
negative contrasts, which are threatening experiences of sudden shifts into negative moods 
(Crouch, Lewis, Erickson, & Newman, 2017; Newman et al., 2019). These studies were limited, 
however, by the fact that they did not examine specific domains of naturalistic interpersonal 
behavior that may be perceived as threatening in participants’ daily lives. Furthermore, it 
remains unclear whether individuals with high levels of GAD symptoms would perceive 
specific, naturalistic interpersonal behaviors (e.g., dominance, coldness, morally disgusting) as 
threatening, and whether they would perceive these behaviors as more threatening than 
individuals with low levels of trait GAD symptoms.  
Regarding the second core process in GAD (i.e., affective reactivity), individuals with 
GAD symptoms tend to show heightened physiological arousal in response to perceived threats. 
In humans, perceiving a threat is associated with a rapid increase in physiological arousal and 
negative affect (Carver & White, 1994; Gray, 1982). This reaction serves to signal the presence 
of threat to the organism and prepare the body to respond to the threat and maximize chances for 
survival (Kemeny, 2003; Lange & James, 1922). However, this process appears to be 
dysfunctional in individuals with increased GAD symptoms, as GAD has been theorized to cause 
greater reactivity toward threats (Newman et al,. 2013). For instance, worrying is associated with 




et al., 2014; Stapinski et al., 2010), increased heart rate (Hoffman et al., 2005), and decreased 
heart rate variability (Aldao, Mennin, & McLaughlin, 2013) in response to perceived or 
anticipated threats. Furthermore, even when compared to individuals with unipolar depression, 
individuals with GAD symptoms self-reported higher levels of trait emotion intensity and 
affective reactivity (Aldao et al., 2010). As such, we would expect GAD symptoms, rather than 
depression symptoms, to be associated with heightened affective reactivity to perceived threats 
in daily, naturalistic situations. Prior research has shown that depressed participants tend to 
report less arousal in response to negative stimuli compared to anxious participants and 
participants with comorbid anxiety and depression (Rosebrock, Hoxha, Norris, Cacioppo, & 
Gollan, 2016). Furthermore, while participants diagnosed with an anxiety disorder showed 
heightened startle response to aversive stimuli compared to healthy controls, participants with 
comorbid depression and anxiety disorders showed blunted startle response (Yancey, 
Vaidyanathan, & Patrick, 2014). Therefore, we would expect that, in situations that are likely to 
be perceived as threatening to people in general, individuals with depression symptoms might 
show less affective reactivity, whereas individuals with GAD symptoms are likely to exhibit 
greater affective reactivity. 
Interventions for GAD symptoms often target these two processes to help the individual 
manage threat perceptions as well as track and reduce negative affect (Szkodny, Newman, & 
Goldfried, 2014; Van Bockstaele et al., 2014); for instance, cognitive interventions attempt to 
help individuals reduce catastrophic interpretations of events and applied relaxation can help 
them reduce anxious arousal and tension. However, current evidence-based treatments for GAD 
yield limited treatment response (Hanrahan, Field, Jones, & Davey, 2013), indicating a clear 




better understanding how perception of threat and affective reactivity show up in daily 
interactions may uncover specific targets for treatment that help to improve outcomes.  
The Need to Study GAD-Relevant Interpersonal Processes Specifically 
 Interpersonal dysfunction in GAD is an understudied context for threat perception and 
distress. Ample evidence implicates a that individuals high in GAD symptoms may be sensitive 
to perceiving threats in the interpersonal domain. For instance, people with GAD often report 
that interpersonal concerns are one of their most commonly endorsed worries (Breitholtz, 
Johansson, & Ost, 1995; Goncalves & Byrne, 2012; Roemer, Molina, & Borkovec, 1997). 
People with clinical levels of worry are susceptible to heightened interpersonal sensitivity 
(Gasperini, Battaglia, Daferia, & Bellodi, 1990; Hoehn-Saric et al., 1993; Mavissakalian, 
Hamann, Haidar, & de Groot, 1995; Nisita et al., 1990) and negatively biased perceptions of 
social information (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg, Mathews, & Eysenck, 1992). 
Furthermore, GAD is associated with a range of self-reported interpersonal problems 
(Przeworski et al., 2011; Salzer et al., 2008). 
For instance, cluster analyses (Przeworski et al., 2011; Salzer et al., 2008) have identified 
heterogeneous self-reported interpersonal problems among individuals with GAD. Across 
multiple studies, these participants with GAD varied in terms of what predominant types of 
interpersonal problems they most strongly endorsed, including being too intrusive, exploitable, 
nonassertive, or cold. If GAD symptoms are associated with a variety of interpersonal problems, 
then it is important to further tease apart factors that contribute to these differences, whether 
trait- or state-level differences. Przeworski and colleagues (2011) found that the different 
interpersonal clusters of participants did not differ in their level of distress, attachment problems, 




diagnosis. In the authors’ second study, about 68% of the individuals with GAD had a comorbid 
personality disorder. Given that personality disorders are associated with patterns of 
interpersonal dysfunction (Pincus & Hopwood, 2012) that include trait-like biased perceptions of 
others and strong affective reactions to others’ interpersonal behaviors (e.g., Berenson, Downey, 
Rafaeli, Coifman, & Paquin, 2011), the overlap with GAD warrants additional research to 
identify patterns of interpersonal dysfunction in individuals with GAD symptoms at not only trait 
but particularly the state level.  
If considering possible daily interpersonal tendencies, another point that remains unclear 
from the two cluster analysis studies (Przeworski et al., 2011; Salzer et al., 2008) is regarding 
which interpersonal behaviors individuals with GAD would react to with the most intense 
negative affect and arousal. Because each of the clusters of interpersonal problems (i.e., 
intrusive, exploitable, nonassertive, or cold) varied in levels of dominance and affiliation, it 
needs to be understood whether individuals with GAD symptoms would be particularly prone to 
experiencing high arousal and negative affect in response to specific kinds of daily interpersonal 
behaviors. 
One sizeable limitation of the extant research on GAD symptoms and interpersonal 
dysfunction is that the findings primarily consist of general trait-like tendencies found in cross-
sectional studies (e.g., one-time self-reports or lab interactions) that are presumed to hold 
constant across interpersonal interactions. Given assertions that specific ongoing patterns of 
behaviors in interpersonal interactions may maintain psychopathology (Carson, 1991; Horowitz, 
2004; Safran & Segal., 1990), it is surprising that few studies have specifically examined 
situation-specific, dynamically varying interpersonal processes in individuals with GAD 




psychiatric disorders (e.g., borderline personality disorder, antisocial personality disorder; 
Sadikaj, Moskowitz, Russell, Zuroff, & Paris, 2013; Scott et al., 2017, respectively) and 
maladaptive interpersonal traits (e.g., narcissism; Wright et al., 2017). However, research is 
warranted to better understand the relationship between trait GAD symptoms and daily 
interpersonal interaction states, particularly regarding their affective reactions to perceiving 
others’ interpersonal behaviors.    
Whole Trait Theory Provides a Way to Link Traits and Within-Person States 
Whole Trait Theory (WTT; Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015; Fleeson & Law, 2015) 
posits an inseparable link between broad, descriptive traits (e.g., neuroticism) and their 
expression in daily situations and states. WTT offers a synthesis of the classic debate about 
whether behavior is predominantly a reflection of personality traits or situation-specific factors. 
On one side of the debate, people differ from each other in the types of dispositional traits that 
broadly describe their behavioral tendencies (e.g., extraversion, agreeableness). On the other side 
of the debate, individuals often demonstrate considerable within-person variability in their 
behavior across situations in daily life due to variations in external stimuli (i.e., others’ 
behaviors) and internal processes (e.g., cognitions, affect). However, WTT combines these two 
frames by suggesting that a ‘whole trait’ is a compilation of an individual’s daily behavior states 
across contexts into a frequency distribution curve, which portrays the pattern of an individual’s 
varied, daily behavior as an expression of a single, stable trait of their personality. In this way, 
WTT helps researchers account for both within-person variability across situations and trait-like 
stability of the distribution of behaviors. Furthermore, WTT posits that the trait explanatory 




For instance, aggregating an individual’s extraverted states (e.g., cognitions, affects, 
behaviors) over time can strongly predict their mean level of extraversion in subsequent periods; 
moreover, the standard deviation, skew, and kurtosis of extraversion states within a single person 
are similarly stable when aggregated across time, despite large within-person variability from 
moment to moment (i.e., the mean and SD of one’s extraverted behaviors in one week is 
correlated with the mean and SD in a subsequent week; Fleeson, 2001). Thus, WTT provides a 
conceptual and statistical framework for examining trait-like characteristics to predict their 
associated daily within-person states. Previous theory and research support this assertion by 
suggesting that certain trait-like characteristics or conditions (e.g., borderline personality 
disorder) predict stronger within-person links between state-level perceptions and affect (e.g., 
Berenson et al., 2011). Therefore, WTT applied to the current study may be used to investigate 
whether GAD symptoms, as a trait-like individual difference variable, amplifies (i.e., moderates) 
within-person links between the perception of others’ behaviors and state affective reactions in 
daily interpersonal interactions, specifically with behaviors that are conceptualized as 
interpersonal threats (i.e., high dominance, coldness, or morally disgusting). The reported 
perceptions and reactions may explain a portion of GAD which, according to WTT, we could 
assume that GAD is an output of these daily perceptions and reactions. Therefore, collecting 
multiple state-level variables (daily perceptions & reactions) can be combined to explain 
between-person differences in GAD as a broader trait.  
The Interpersonal Circumplex as a Framework for the Interpersonal Domain 
 Although previous studies have examined threat perceptions broadly in GAD (e.g., 
reactions to “negative” faces; Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom, & de Bono, 1999), a conceptual 




Interpersonal Circumplex (IPC; Wiggins, 1982) offers a framework for classifying interpersonal 
behaviors that would be expected to vary across daily interactions. It is visualized as a two-
dimensional circle containing orthogonal axes that broadly represent the dimensions of 
dominance and affiliation (Tracey, 1994). The dominance dimension pertains to agency, 
assertion, differentiating oneself, autonomy, and strivings for power (Pincus & Hopwood, 2012), 
and comprises behaviors that range from dominance to submissive or yielding behavior. The 
affiliation dimension represents strivings for unity and intimacy (Pincus & Hopwood, 2012) and 
ranges from warm/social/close to cold/distancing behavior. Since these two axes are plotted on a 
circle, the IPC can represent each combination of these behaviors around the circumplex 
(Gurtman, 2009). For instance, extraverted behavior reflects a blend of high dominance and high 
affiliation. Furthermore, research suggests that perceptions of others’ social behavior may also be 
mapped onto the dominance and affiliation dimensions, thus supporting the validity of these 
fundamental social cognitive dimensions (Moskowitz & Zuroff, 2005), and suggesting the 
possibility that perceiving excessive dominance or low affiliation in others might be threatening.  
Studies using the interpersonal circumplex show that these two dimensions are relevant to many 
types of interpersonal behaviors (Moskowitz, 1994). In addition, correlations of the theorized 
behavior characteristics have been shown to adhere to a circular structure, and support the 
orthogonality of the dominance and affiliation dimensions (Gurtman, 2009; Gurtman & Pincus, 
2000).  
Perceived Morality Is a Third Social Cognitive Dimension 
 Recent theory and research (e.g., Landy, Piazza, & Goodwin, 2016) suggests the possible 
inclusion of a third social cognitive or interpersonal dimension beyond dominance and 




because some measures of affiliation seem to confound mere social proximity (approaching 
others, socializing, or distancing oneself from others) with morally-valenced social behaviors 
(e.g., kindness and altruism versus coldhearted actions; Landy et al., 2016). As such, adding 
morality as a third dimension to the circumplex may provide additional, vital descriptions of 
interpersonal behavior. In fact, perceived morality seems to provide important information about 
the intent of another’s social behavior beyond competence (i.e., dominance) and warmth (i.e., 
affiliation; Goodwin, 2015). Similarly, behavior that is helpful and cooperative toward others is 
generally considered morally good (Curry, Mullins, & Whitehouse, 2019), and therefore humans 
may be inherently attentive to whether others’ interpersonal behavior adheres, or conflicts, with 
such social mores. In contrast, perceiving a person engaging in behavior that is low in morality 
may present a social risk in that it may be unsafe to try cooperate with a person prone to such 
behaviors (e.g., lying, cheating, stealing; Miles, Griffiths, Richardson, & Macrae, 2010; Van ‘t 
Wout & Sanfey, 2008) and they too may be less likely to reciprocate cooperation (Curry et al., 
2019).  
One way to detect the presence of morally valenced behavior within interpersonal 
interactions would be to assess the extent to which behaviors elicit moral elevation versus socio-
moral disgust (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014; Haidt, 2003; Haidt, 2006). Moral elevation 
(Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Beck, 2006) occurs in response to perceiving uncommon acts of moral 
goodness. The experience of moral elevation has been described as feeling subjectively uplifted, 
and appears to involve somatic sensations such as being moved to tears or feeling a lump in the 
throat (Algoe & Haidt, 2009), increased cognitions about the goodness of humanity (Erickson & 
Abelson, 2012), and increased motivation to become a better person (Algoe & Haidt, 2009; 




marker for perceiving others’ behavior as morally desirable. In contrast, socio-moral disgust may 
index the low end of the perceived moral dimension. Socio-moral disgust is related to core 
disgust (i.e., elicited by thoughts of ingesting physical contaminants) but is thought to occur in 
response to acts perceived as morally impure or contaminating (Olantunji & Sawchuk, 2005; 
Pizarro, Inbar, & Helion, 2011). In both core- and sociomoral disgust, the reaction is to establish 
a psychological, and in some cases a physical, boundary to ward off the “contaminant” 
(Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012), and in this way socio-moral disgust may function like a 
reaction to an interpersonal threat.  
To date there is minimal research on the proposed moral dimension to support its 
existence within the interpersonal domain. Most of the investigation of elevation and socio-moral 
disgust have involved prototypical exemplars that elicit the emotion, such as learning the story of 
someone who “saved [another person’s] from a life of gang activity and violence” (Silvers & 
Haidt, 2008, p. 292) versus committing fraud or theft (Tybur, Lieberman, & Griskevicius, 2009), 
respectively. However, no known research has examined perceptions of morally elevating versus 
morally disgusting interpersonal behaviors in daily life.  
The research that has been done strongly supported that perceived trait morality is unique 
from trait dominance and affiliation. Across a combined total of 13 studies, Landy and 
colleagues (2016) and Goodwin and colleagues (2014) sought to understand the differential 
influence of perceived morality compared to sociability (i.e., affiliation) and competence (i.e., 
dominance) on impressions of other people. Trait adjectives that varied in morality, sociability, 
and competence were developed (Goodwin et al., 2014, Studies 1 & 2) and subsequently used as 
descriptions of people and roles in hypothetical vignettes. In addition, in some of the studies, 




sociable (i.e., affiliation; Goodwin et al., 2014, Studies 4 -7) or both sociable and competence 
traits (Goodwin et al., 2014, Studies 2 & 3; Landy et a., 2016, Studies 1-6). The results 
consistently showed that moral traits were 1) preferred to sociable and competence traits and 2) 
the most influential of the three groups of traits on forming positive (or negative in the case of 
immoral traits) impressions of others. However, the studies were limited in that they were cross-
sectional and focused on the participants’ global appraisals (e.g., like or dislike) of morality in 
abstract trait descriptions or written vignettes.  
To expand upon this research, subsequent studies should investigate how participants 
perceive daily, naturalistic behaviors that vary in dominance, affiliation, and morality, and 
whether these dimensions have a differential effect on the perceiver’s self-reported affective 
reactions. Examining the affective reaction would add additional context to the perceived 
behavior and speak to the possible function of the behavior; for instance, whether a given 
interpersonal behavior (e.g., dominant, cold, immoral) was perceived as threatening, as 
suggested by a combination of high arousal and low valence.  
Empirical Evidence Implies Moral Components of GAD 
Interpersonal research on GAD has thus far only utilized the two dimensions of 
dominance and affiliation. For instance, high worry and/or GAD symptoms have been linked to 
either 1) self-reported interpersonal problems comprised of blends of dominance and affiliation 
(Przeworski et al., 2011; Salzer et al., 2008) or 2) specifically affiliative processes (e.g., being 
overly nurturant; e.g., Erickson et al., 2016; Shin & Newman, 2019; Zainal & Newman, 2017). 
However, a few studies suggest reasons to suspect that individuals high in GAD symptoms may 




For instance, a factor analysis of 20 different types of worries – several of which were a 
priori defined as worries about one’s morality (e.g., “I worry that I have sometimes been 
dishonest in my work,” “I worry that I have made bad choices when faced with moral conflicts,” 
“I worry that people will find out what I really am like”) – showed that moral concerns, versus 
practical or self-image concerns, emerged as the largest factor, thus suggesting that one’s 
morality was a predominant foci of worry (Kroll et al., 2002). In addition, Erickson and 
colleagues (2016) found that higher trait worry uniquely predicted higher self-reported 
compassionate motivations to help others, despite the fact that worriers’ significant others did not 
view them similarly. Worriers may thus perceive their worrying as a moral action. Regarding the 
present study, engaging in frequent moral actions may make a person more sensitive to 
perceiving threats to their morality. Additional evidence by Hebert and colleagues’ (2014) 
indicates that worriers tend to endorse the metacognitive belief “I worry because I care,” 
implying that they may view worry as a way to deal with perceived moral shortcomings, 
injustices, or imperfections in the world. Other research has shown increased cognitive empathy 
(i.e., attention to social information) in individuals with GAD symptoms when induced to worry 
(Zainal & Newman, 2017), which may indicate a moral component to worry in terms of 
prosocial cognitions. Finally, in another study, Erickson and Abelson (2012) examined the link 
between daily moral elevation and anxiety symptoms. They found that days in which participants 
(a mixed clinical sample including some participants with GAD) reported higher moral 
elevation, relative to their own means, they also endorsed fewer anxiety and dysphoria 
symptoms. However, the authors did not examine social perceptions occurring within the context 





The theory of Morality as Cooperation (Curry, Mullins, & Whitehouse, 2019) posits that 
behaviors regarding helping group members helping family members, and reciprocating 
cooperation with others. Perhaps individuals with high trait worry are more sensitive to these 
types of behaviors or feel more afraid of their not being the subject of others’ cooperation. 
Furthermore, perhaps these findings suggest that individuals with GAD symptoms may hold 
concerns about their cooperating with others and/or whether others will cooperate with them. 
Nevertheless, we might expect individuals with high trait GAD symptoms to be particularly 
sensitive to interpersonal threats that are low in morality.  
There is Limited Evidence About How People with GAD Perceive Others’ Behaviors 
What studies have been done show that people with GAD seem to have a bias toward 
perceiving others as dominant, cold (i.e. unaffiliative), and cold-dominant (Newman & Erickson, 
2010; Erickson & Pincus, 2005). This pattern remained even after controlling for depression and 
social anxiety symptoms (Newman & Erickson, 2010). Furthermore, during first impressions in a 
social interaction task with a friendly stranger, the participants with GAD symptoms were 
relatively more like to perceive experimental confederates as attacking, ignoring, and controlling 
(Erickson & Pincus, 2005). While these results offer little context to help give meaning to the 
perceptions, we might assume that because of the propensity of individuals with GAD symptoms 
to attend to threats, the perceived behavior may have functioned as perceived threats. Therefore, 
we might expect people with high trait GAD symptoms to report more perceptions of dominant 
and cold behavior across daily interactions. Moreover, given the tendency of “immoral” 
behaviors to be perceived as aversive (Chapman & Anderson, 2013; Pizarro et al., 2011), we 
might also expect individuals with high trait GAD symptoms to report more perceptions of 




Interpersonal Behaviors as Perceived Threats 
While the IPC offers a broad framework for understanding interpersonal behaviors, 
researchers must conceptualize IPC behaviors in ways that give meaning to the behaviors in 
relation to the trait variable being investigated. Given that GAD is associated with sensitivity to 
perceiving threats, we can conceptualize specific IPC behaviors in terms of their potential to 
function as interpersonal threats. Although virtually any behavior can be perceived as threatening 
based on how it is interpreted, some behaviors have been more consistently linked to 
interpersonal threat than others. For instance, interpersonal threats include behaviors that may be 
associated with detrimental social ramifications such as negative evaluation (Knowles, Lucas, 
Molden, Gardner, & Dean, 2010), verbal punishment (Hebl, King, Glick, Singletary, & Kazama, 
2007), rejection (Kross, Egner, Ochsner, Hirsch, & Downey, 2007), abandonment (Eng, 
Heimberg, Hart, Schneier, & Liebowitz, 2001), being exploited (Glick & Fiske, 1996), or 
damage to one’s reputation from being associated with others’ immoral behavior (Sacheva, Iliev, 
& Medin, 2009; Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012). These behaviors can be interpreted as 
threatening to the extent that they block the psychological needs (Knowles et al., 2010) of 
autonomy, competence, and belonging, all of which would otherwise facilitate psychological 
adjustment and well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2000). 
Given that behavior can be interpreted in virtually any way, it is important to emphasize 
how specific behaviors may be interpreted with respect to a trait of interest (e.g., GAD 
symptoms). Since GAD is associated with heightened sensitivity to perceived threats, what 
follows is a conceptualization of IPC behaviors on the three dimensions as interpersonal threats. 





First, another person’s dominant behavior may threaten one’s need for competence or 
autonomy (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Second, cold behavior may threaten one’s need for 
relatedness/belongingness (Ryan & Deci, 2000). In contrast, warm behavior may be perceived as 
safe and reassuring, submissive behavior may appear compliant and overtly non-threatening 
(Newman et al., 2013). Third, although morally elevating behavior may be perceived as 
trustworthy and signal good moral character (Keltner, Kogan, Piff, & Saturn, 2014), perceived 
immoral social behavior may signal low trustworthiness (Van ‘t Wout & Sanfey, 2008) and low 
cooperation (Curry et al., 2019), and threaten one’s need for moral self-worth (Sacheva, Iliev, & 
Medin, 2009) as well as the need to avoid being “contaminated” by another person’s impure 
behavior (Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012; Tang et al., 2017; Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). 
Furthermore, perceiving others’ moral behavior may be threatening if it evokes an upward social 
comparison, sparks fears of being judged as morally inferior, or stirs uncertainty about one’s own 
morality (Monin, 2007).  
Affective Responses May Suggest Perceived Threats 
The affective response to a perceived behavior is a key component that implies whether a 
behavior was considered threatening. For instance, fear, anxiety, and shame are three negative 
emotions that have been shown to arise in response to perceived threats (e.g., Arnaudova et al., 
2017; Leech, Barnes-Holmes, Madden, 2016). When broken into their constituent components, 
fear, anxiety, and shame consist of negative affect (i.e., unpleasantness) and heightened 
physiological arousal (Carver & White, 1994; Jefferies, Smilek, Eich, & Enns, 2008), whereas 
other types of negative emotions, such as sadness, would include negative affect and decreased 
physiological arousal (Jefferies, Smilek, Eich, & Enns, 2008). In contrast, emotion that is 




(e.g., joy, excitement), which is more likely to evoke approach behaviors (Carver & White, 
1994). Therefore, determining whether a stimulus was perceived as threatening depends upon the 
emotion it evokes. For instance, one person’s increase in arousal and negative affect in response 
to another person’s cold behavior suggests the behavior was perceived as threatening, whereas a 
different person’s positive emotion evoked by the same behavior implies it was perceived as 
rewarding. Although we would expect most people to react with negative affect and arousal to 
interpersonal behaviors that are perceived as dominant, cold, and immoral, GAD symptoms 
likely moderate these relationships in that having higher levels of GAD symptoms may 
prospectively predict higher self-reported affective reactions to perceived interpersonal threats.  
The Present Study 
Therefore, the present study sought to examine participants’ baseline trait levels of self-
reported GAD symptoms in relation to their daily perceptions of others’ behaviors and affective 
responses to the behaviors. Broadly, I expect perceptions of dominant, cold (low affiliation), and 
immoral or disgusting interpersonal behaviors to predict greater negative affect and arousal, 
thereby functioning as interpersonal threats across all the participants, but that GAD symptoms 
will moderate these relationships by strengthening them. 
Hypotheses 
First (GAD main effects), I hypothesized that baseline trait GAD symptoms will 
prospectively predict higher daily perceptions of others’ dominant behavior (Hypothesis [H] 1a), 
cold behavior (H1b), and immoral behavior (H1c) as well as high self-reported arousal (H2a) and 
lower valence (H2b). Given that GAD is associated with increased sensitivity to threats, and the 
literature suggests that perceived threats are more likely to occur with dominant, cold, and 




symptoms would report more instances of these behaviors as opposed to the presumably less-
threatening behaviors (warmth, submission, moral behavior). Furthermore, given that GAD 
involves physiological arousal symptoms and that worry involves the experience of negative 
affect (i.e., fear, anxiety), I predicted increased reported GAD symptoms to be related to 
increased reports of arousal and lower valence.  
Second (social perception main effects), I hypothesize between-person effects, such that 
higher mean levels of perceived dominant behavior, cold behavior, and immoral behavior across 
daily interactions will each predict higher self-reported arousal (H3a, H4a, & H5a, respectively) 
and lower valence (H3b, H4b, & H5b, respectively). Individuals who are chronically exposed to 
perceived interpersonal threats may experience higher levels of affective arousal and lower 
valence compared to participants with less exposure to interpersonal threats. Next, I hypothesize 
that within-person increases in perceived dominant behavior, cold behavior, and immoral 
behavior in daily interactions will each predict higher self-reported arousal (H3c, H4c, & H5c, 
respectively) and lower valence (H3d, H4d, & H5d, respectively). That is, after accounting for 
each participant’s mean level of perceptions of others, when participants perceive increases in 
dominant, cold, or immoral behavior, they would report higher arousal and lower valence 
relative to their own mean. This is because dominant, cold, and immoral behavior are more likely 
to be perceived of as threatening across the participants, as they may threaten the needs for 
autonomy, belongingness, and avoiding contamination, respectively.  
Third (GAD symptom moderation effects). I hypothesize that trait GAD symptoms will 
moderate (strengthen) the relationships between daily mean perceived dominant behavior, cold 
behavior, and immoral behavior and self-reported arousal (H6a, H7a, & H8a, respectively) and 




would show stronger chronic affective responses to perceived dominant, cold, and immoral 
behavior across the daily interactions. Furthermore, I hypothesize that trait GAD symptoms will 
moderate (strengthen) the within-person relationships between perceived dominant behavior, 
cold behavior, and immoral behavior and self-reported arousal (H6c, H7c, & H8c, respectively) 
and valence (H6d, H7d, & H8d, respectively). Although I predicted that dominant, cold, and 
immoral behaviors will be perceived of as threatening to people in general, individuals with 
more severe GAD symptoms were likely to find these interpersonal behaviors more threatening. 
Figures 1-3 depict the hypothesized theoretical models of direct and moderating effects between 
the variables. 
Figure 1  



























To examine test these hypotheses, undergraduates were recruited from psychology 
courses at a private university in the Pacific Northwest between Fall 2017 and Summer 2018. 
They were offered course credit in exchange for their participation, whereas individuals who 
declined to participate were instead given the option to write an essay for course credit. A total of 
182 Participants completed baseline measures, however 18 did not complete any daily diary 
surveys, one participant completed only one survey, and one participant was identified as using a 
response set. Therefore, 21 participants were deleted from the analyses, resulting in a final 
sample of 161 participants aged 18 to 25 years (82.6% female, 1.2% gender non-binary). The 
participants self-identified as White (55.3%), Black (2.5%), Latinx (9.3%), Multiracial (14.3%), 
Asian (15.5%), Middle Eastern (1.9%), Samoan/Pacific Islander (0.6%), and one participant did 
not disclose their race or ethnicity (0.6%).  
Procedure 
Following recruitment, participants were sent an Internet link to a Qualtrics survey that 
contained the baseline self-report measures regarding their demographics and GAD symptoms. 
Several other measures were completed at baseline as a part of a larger study about interpersonal 
behavior, personality, cognition, and emotion. However, only the measures used in the present 
study are discussed further. After completing the baseline measures, participants were sent 30 
experience sampling surveys over the subsequent 10 days (3 surveys per day) via text or email, 
based on each participant’s preference. Odd-numbered waves were sent at 11am, 3pm, and 8pm 




To minimize participant adoption of response sets, in which they respond to a 
questionnaire the same way each time, the research team created two versions of the daily survey 
and randomized the order that participants were sent each version across the 30 surveys. To 
maximize participant engagement and minimize attrition as participants completed the daily 
surveys, I emailed participants once or twice during the daily diary protocol with a pre-written 
and pre-approved standardized message to inform participants 1) of how many surveys had been 
completed to that point, 2) to finish any uncompleted surveys, and 3) offer encouragement for 
having completed surveys. For the participants whose surveys had timed out or the links were 
lost or broken, I sent additional anonymized Qualtrics survey links (randomized survey version 1 
or 2) until the participants completed 30 surveys or stopped responding. Participants were 
awarded their extra credit shortly after completing the 10 days of experience sampling, 
regardless of the number of daily surveys they completed.  
Measures 
Baseline Generalized Anxiety Disorder Symptoms - Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
Questionnaire for DSM-IV (GAD-Q-IV; Newman et al., 2002) 
 The GAD-Q-IV is a widely-used nine-item self-report measure of dimensional worry 
symptoms over the preceding six months (Newman et al., 2002). It was developed to serve as a 
brief screening instrument for the DSM-IV version of GAD. Given that the DSM-5 GAD criteria 
are nearly identical to those from the DSM-IV, the GAD-Q-IV can still be used to screen for the 
DSM-5 version of GAD (Pierson, Prenoveau, Craske, Netsi, & Stein, 2017). The GAD-Q-IV 
includes five yes/no items, two 8-point Likert-type scales (0 = none, 8 = very severe), one 
checklist of symptoms, and a free-response asking the respondent to list his or her specific topics 




a maximum of two points if the respondent includes six distinct topics about which they worry. 
Additionally, answering “no” to having experienced worry consistently over the preceding six 
months allows respondents to skip the second half of the assessment. However, the participants’ 
responses to the second half can be retained when using the instrument to assess dimensional 
GAD symptoms (M. Newman, personal communication, December 11, 2019). All the answers 
can be computed into a total scale score, with higher scores representing higher presence of self-
reported GAD symptoms. Newman and colleagues established a cut score of 5.7 to classify 
scores that indicate probable GAD diagnosis. However, subsequent research increased the cut 
score to 7.67 to better balance sensitivity and specificity (Moore, Anderson, Barnes, Haigh, & 
Fresco, 2014).  
The GAD-Q-IV has been used in investigations of interventions for GAD (Jonsson & 
Kjellgren, 2015), as an outcome measure for GAD treatment (Dahlin et al., 2016), to examine 
cognitive processes underlying GAD (Goodwin, Eagleson, Mathews, Yiend, & Hirsch, 2017), 
and in the investigation of factors that maintain worry (Llera & Newman, 2014). Concurrent 
validity with GAD diagnoses obtained through structured clinical interview, the Anxiety 
Disorder Interview Schedule for the DSM-IV (ADIS-IV; Brown, Di Nardo, & Barlow, 1994) 
was Kappa = .67, wherein the GAD-Q-IV accurately classified 88% of the participants and had a 
false positive rate of 11% (Newman et al., 2002). Concurrent validity between the GAD-Q-IV 
and the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Meyer et al., 1990) ranged from r = .55 (Newman et 
al., 2002) to r = .75 (Toh et al., 2017).  
Discriminant validity was tested in a sample of 391 undergraduate students (Newman et 
al., 2002). The GAD-Q-IV was found to discriminate between PTSD symptoms (r = .45), Social 




and fear of relaxation (r = .58). However, no significant differences have been found for GAD-
Q-IV scores between individuals with GAD and those with comorbid GAD and Major 
Depressive Disorder (Kircanski, Thompson, Sorenson, Sherdell, & Gotlib, 2015). 
Test-retest reliability between the GAD-Q-IV taken at two weeks apart was kappa = .64, 
with 92% of individuals retaining their GAD diagnosis over the two weeks (Newman et al., 
2002). Reported internal consistency has ranged from .75 (Ruggiero et al., 2017) to .82 
(Miranda, Fontes, & Marroquín, 2008). Internal consistency for the present sample was good (α 
= .81). 
Baseline Depression Symptoms – The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale 
(CES-D Scale; Radloff, 1977) 
The CES-D is a 20-item self-report measure of depression symptoms over the past week. 
The depression symptoms fall into a 4-factor structure of depressed affect, positive affect 
(reverse-scored), somatic symptoms and psychomotor retardation, and interpersonal difficulties, 
but given correlated factors, all items are combined into a composite score. Respondents rate 
each item on a four-point Likert scale to indicate the duration they experienced each symptom (0 
= Rarely or None of the Time [Less than 1 day]; 1 = Some or a Little of the Time [1-2 days]; 2 = 
Occasionally or a Moderate Amount of Time [3-4 days]; 3 = Most or All of the Time [5-7 days]). 
The items are summed for a possible total scale score ranging from zero to 60, and higher scores 
indicate more severe depression symptoms. Radloff (1977) identified an initial cutoff score of 16 
as suggesting clinically significant depression. However, a recent meta-analysis of 28 studies 
using the CES-D indicated that a cutoff score of 20 provided a better balance of sensitivity and 
specificity (Vilagut, Forero, Barbaglia, & Alonso, 2016). It has been effectively used in diverse 




2017), and French (Moullec et al., 2010). It has shown good convergent validity with the PHQ-9 
(Milette, Hudson, Baron, & Thombs, 2010) and the trait anxiety subscale of the State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Orme, Reis, & Herz, 1986). Furthermore, it has shown discriminant 
validity with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale and the state subscale of the STAI (Orme, Reis, & 
Herz, 1986). However, women have been found to report higher scores on the CES-D compared 
to men (Carleton et al., 2013). Internal consistency has ranged from good (α = .85) to excellent 
(α = .94) across undergraduate, rehabilitation, clinical, a Canadian community sample, and 
United States nation-wide survey samples (Carleton et al., 2013). Internal consistency for the 
present sample was acceptable (α = .78).  
Daily Perceptions of Others’ Behavior in Naturalistic Interactions 
Each of the surveys asked participants to retrospectively report on their most recent 
interpersonal interaction that lasted at least 5 minutes. Participants reported the other person's 
initials, gender, and role (e.g., romantic partner, acquaintance, authority figure) and then briefly 
described the person's behavior. However, these variables were not examined in the present 
study. Then the surveys prompted participants to rate their perception of the other person’s 
behavior along the dimensions of dominance, affiliation, and morality (e.g., “How dominant was 
the other person’s behavior?”) with three 5-point Likert-type scales (i.e., not at all, a little, 
moderately, a lot, extremely), and with multiple anchors for each dimension. Each IPC 
dimension was assessed with single items to permit a comparison of quantified ratings of 
perceived behavior and to minimize the participant’s burden of responding to repeated items 
across 30 surveys. Furthermore, each participant was expected to perceive varying levels of 
dominant, cold, and immoral behaviors differently across interpersonal interactions and 




sampling has shown that perceptions of others’ behaviors often vary both between- and within-
person (e.g., Scott et al., 2017). The Spearman-Brown coefficient for the split-half reliabilities 
for each dimension were acceptable (dominance = .78, affiliation = .78, and morality = .78).  
Daily Affective Response - Affect Grid (Russell, Weiss, & Mendelsohn, 1989) 
The affect grid is a two-dimensional plane comprised of two orthogonal dimensions of 
emotional arousal and valence (Figure 4). Arousal ranges from sleepiness to high arousal and 
valence ranges from positive, pleasant feelings to negative, unpleasant feelings. This measure 
allows easy single-item repeated assessment of emotion without unduly burdening participants in 
repeated measures designs (Russell et al., 1989). In the present study, participants were prompted 
to, “Please click once on the emotion grid to rate HOW YOU FELT during the interaction.” 
Participants then selected a point on a displayed 96 x 95 grid that best characterized their affect. 
The grid was overlaid with an image of Russell and colleagues’ 9 x 9 affect grid. Around the grid 
were text with affective anchors including, Excitement, Sleepiness, High Arousal, Unpleasant 
Feelings, etc., that varied according to the two underlying dimensions. Each participant’s 
selection was coded by Qualtrics as x and y coordinates, where the x-axis indicated the level of 
affective valence and the y-axis indicated the level of affective arousal. Other studies have been 
found that used a similarly fine-grained affect grid for repeated measures assessments (Kuppens, 














Figure 4  
 
Affect grid from Russell et al., 1989. 
 
 
The affect grid’s psychometric properties have been shown to be adequate. Evidence of 
the orthogonal relationship between the valence and arousal dimensions support the affect grid’s 
construct validity and discriminant validity for the valence and arousal dimensions (Killgore, 
1998; Russell et al., 1989). Estimates of convergent validity have included moderate to strong 
correlations between the valence dimension with the Beck Depression Inventory, the Positive 
and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), and the Profile of 
Mood States (POMS; McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1992). The arousal dimension showed small 
to moderate correlations with the positive affect PANAS items and the Vigor and Fatigue items 
of the POMS (Killgore, 1998). The affect grid’s low overlap of correlations with the different 
measures further support its discriminant validity.  
Because the affect grid is a single-item measure of affect, traditional estimates of 
reliability and internal consistency are less applicable compared to measures with multiple items 
(Tiede, 2019). However, Russell and colleagues (1989) calculated split-half reliability across two 




were small (ns = 20 and 25), the split half reliabilities for the valence dimension were .98 and 
.99, respectively, and for the arousal dimension was .97 across both studies. In a recent study, 
Tiede (2019) had 19 participants completed an average of 28 affect grid ratings across a week of 
experience sampling. The author found within-person split-half reliability of r = .80 (valence) 
and r = .73 (arousal). For the present study, the Spearman Brown coefficient for the affect grid’s 
split-half reliability was acceptable for the arousal dimension (r = .74) and for the valence 
dimension (r = .75).  
Data Analytic Plan  
Power Considerations 
 A post-hoc power analysis is desired, given that the current study utilized an archival 
dataset. The present study aimed to detect cross-level interactions, such as the relationship 
between Level 1 predictors (i.e., perceptions of behavior) that may differ as a function of the 
Level 2 variable (i.e., GAD symptom severity; Mathieu, Aguinis, Culpepper, & Chen, 2012, p. 
951). Calculating power in Multilevel Modeling (MLM) differs from typical procedures in 
regression analyses. For instance, the power to detect cross-level interactions in MLM has been 
shown to depend largely on the cross-level interaction (i.e., effect), sample sizes of the Level 1 
and Level 2 variables, standard deviation (SD) of the Level 1 regression coefficients (Mathieu et 
al., 2012), the level of power, as well as the sizes of the variance components and the covariance 
of the random slope and random intercept (Arend & Schäfer, 2019), and the Intraclass 
Correlation Coefficient (ICC; McCoach, 2010). Moreover, determining power also depends on 
the selected Alpha (i.e., risk of Type I error), which for the present study is α = .05. In a 
repeated-measures design, the sample size is considered for both the Level 2 variable (i.e., 




time). Power is maximized when both the Level 1 and Level 2 samples are sufficiently large, 
which has been suggested to be ≥ 18 and ≥ 115, respectively (Mathieu et al., 2012). The Level 1 
and Level 2 samples sizes for the present study exceed these recommendations.  
Beyond the determination of whether a study has adequate statistical power, it is 
becoming increasingly recommended that researchers identify the effect size(s) that a given 
study is powered to detect. Recently, Arend and Schäfer (2019) provided estimates (based on 
their review of research and a Monte Carlo simulation) for the minimal detectable effect size 
(MDES) for MLM designs. Their estimates are based on standardized effects with standardized 
predictors and outcome variables, so the effect sizes are comparable across measures and studies. 
The authors asserted that power must be determined separately for each desired effect (i.e., L1 & 
L2 main effects, cross-level interaction). The authors indicate that, with a power level of .80 and 
a Level 2 sample size of 150 and Level 1 sample size of 25, there would be sufficient power to 
detect at least a .09 direct effect for the Level 1 variable, regardless of the size of the ICC. Using 
the same parameter estimates, assuming power of at least .80, an ICC of .10 would permit 
detecting a level 2 direct effect of at least .27 (standardized), an ICC of .30 would be sufficient to 
detect an effect of .24, and an ICC of .50 would permit the detection of at least a .23 effect. 
Finally, the MDESs for the cross-level interaction with the same input parameters depends on the 
size of the random slope variance component (RS). An RS of .01 would permit detecting effects 
of at least .51, an RS of .09 would detect a .28 effect, and an RS of .25 would detect a .25 effect. 
Thus, assuming small ICCs (~.10) for the L1 variables and small RS’s (~.01) in the present 
sample, I should have enough statistical power to detect at least a .09 level 1 direct effect, a .27 






 Each participant’s depression symptoms (CES-D) sum score was calculated, after 
reverse-coding the appropriate items, and GAD-Q-IV responses were summed according to 
Newman and colleagues’ (2002) procedure to obtain a total score. Then all the L1 variables were 
first centered at zero so that positive values reflected high arousal, positive valence, and 
perceived dominance, coldness, and immorality; negative values represented low arousal, 
negative valence, and perceived submission, affiliation, and morality, respectively; and scores of 
zero reflected neutrality. This facilitated obtaining descriptive statistics for each variable. Then 
all the L2 study variables were grand-mean centered to control for the central tendencies in 
responding among all the participants in this sample. Separate person-mean centered variables 
were created for each L1 variable by subtracting each participant’s scores by their own means on 
each variable. This facilitated the examination of within-person effects by controlling for each 
participant’s mean. Finally, standardized versions of the variables (except the covariate gender), 
both between- and within-persons, were also calculated to facilitate identification of MDESs.  
Preliminary Analyses 
First, I conducted data pre-screening. Participants who completed fewer than 3 surveys 
were deleted. In addition, one participant’s data was deleted due to their data showing no 
variability (only the maximum ratings of 2s) on both the affiliation and morality dimensions 
across all their surveys, therefore suggesting that the participant used a response set. One 
participant mistakenly completed the entire daily diary protocol twice, resulting in a total of 62 
completed surveys. I examined the results with and without this participant’s data and there were 
no markedly different results. Therefore, to increase variability and power, all of this 




participants who completed a total of 4,533 surveys. The participants completed an average of 
28.16 out of 30 surveys, indicating a 93.9% compliance rate. The data were assessed for the 
degree of missingness. There was no missing data for the baseline measure (GAD-Q-IV), and 
only 5 cells in the daily diaries showed missing data. Therefore, missing data were not imputed 
because the effect is negligible with less than 5% missingness (Cheema 2014; Schafer, 1999).   
Next, all variables and residuals were inspected for normality (e.g., skew, kurtosis). This 
was done by plotting histogram plots of all study variables as well as the residuals for all 
variables. Because there were a large number of surveys completed, traditional tests of normality 
(e.g., Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Shapiro-Wilk) were not appropriate due to an inflated risk for Type 
I error (Field, 2013). Instead, I used visual inspection of the histogram plots and descriptive 
statistics to understand examine degree of skew and kurtosis. In the present study, all the 
variables fell within -.770 to .361 skew and -.794 to .165 kurtosis, thus indicating normal skew 
and kurtosis (Field, 2013). In addition, visual inspection of the histograms suggested that all the 
variables were normally distributed.  
Analytical Strategy 
 I first obtained descriptive statistics for each variable, though it should be noted that the 
L1 variables include multiple entries for each participant. Consequently, the L1 descriptive 
statistics reflect the grand mean of all completed surveys. Then I calculated each participant’s 
mean for each L1 variable and conducted a Pearson’s bivariate correlation between GAD-Q-IV 
score, CES-D score, and participant means for all the L1 variables. To analyze the effects of 
gender, I created two separate dummy coded variables. The first variable was coded to compare 
the effects of female, coded as 1, to non-female participants (i.e., male, gender non-binary), 




the remaining cis-gendered participants, coded as 0. Both dummy coded variables were included 
simultaneously in each analysis. All but one of the analyses showed non-significant effects based 
on gender identity (see Table 1 note). Otherwise, there were negligible differences in the effects 
if gender identity was included or excluded. Therefore, the gender identity variables were 
dropped from the analyses to maximize statistical power, and the effects of gender identity will 
not be discussed further. 
Data were analyzed using multilevel modeling (MLM) via the SPSS 26 MIXED 
command. MLMs are appropriate to account for the nesting of repeated measures (e.g., multiple 
daily interactions; Level 1) within higher-order units (participants; Level 2). In addition, using 
MLMs for the present analyses is advantageous because they can handle unbalanced data 
(participants completing different numbers of surveys), model between- and within-person 
variability, permit random effects and cross-level interactions, and allow researchers to specify 
the type of covariance between repeated L1 variables. For the present analyses, individual 
participants were specified as the L2 groups and daily diaries were specified as L1 repeated 
measures variables. GAD symptoms and depression symptoms were modeled at Level 2 and all 
the remaining variables were modeled at Level 1. An AR1 (autoregressive) covariance structure 
was assumed to be most appropriate covariance structure for the data, as it assumes surveys 
completed close in time are more highly correlated than surveys completed at more distal times. 
However, alternate covariance structures were also tested for optimal fit. Finally, Maximum 
Likelihood (ML) estimation was used, which is generally recommended for large datasets to 
yield more accurate parameter estimates (Field, 2013). 
Nine separate MLMs were conducted to test all the hypotheses. These were conducted 




and outcome variables (for comparison with MDESs). First, I conducted five MLMs to examine 
the fixed effects of GAD symptoms predicting each of the five L1 variables. Gender and 
depression symptoms were modeled as covariates. Both GAD symptoms and depression 
symptoms were grand-mean centered and the outcome variables were in their raw format. This 
procedure permitted the detection of between-person differences of L1 variables at different 
levels of the L2 variables.  
Next, I conducted two MLMs to examine the fixed and random effects of perceived 
dominance, affiliation, and morality on arousal and valence. These predictors were each 
designated as Block 1 in a model-building approach. The L1 predictors included both person-
means and person-mean centered variables to examine the between- and within-person effects, 
respectively. These two MLMs allowed me to examine the unique effects of each social 
perception dimension while simultaneously controlling for the other dimensions and the L2 
variables. Furthermore, modeling random effects permitted the examination of significant 
between-person variability for each of the L1 variables. Because GAD symptoms is a L2 
variable with a single data point for each participant, its random effects were not modeled. 
Again, the L2 variables were included as covariates. For these two analyses, as well as the 
subsequent analyses, GAD symptoms and depression symptoms were grand-mean centered.  
Finally, using a model-building approach, I conducted two more MLMs by adding the six 
interaction variables to each of the previous models in Block 2. This was done to examine how 
GAD interacted with the mean social perceptions and person-centered variables in predicting 
arousal and valence. Significant interactions were followed up with simple slopes analyses 




The AIC was noted to identify the best-fitting model with the optimal level of complexity 
while matching appropriate statistical assumptions. AIC is a transformation of the -2 Log 
Likelihood that is adjusted for the number of predictors in the model (Field, 2013). Although the 
AIC has no inherent meaning by itself, a lower AIC indicates better model fit relative to other 
models with the same dependent variable but different predictors and/or effects. Therefore, I 
compared the AIC of the saturated model to the AIC of previous models.  
In addition, I used the AIC to compare the optimal fit of different covariance structures 
for the repeated-measures, L1 variables. An autoregressive (AR1) covariance structure emerged 
as the best fit for the L1 variables, as other covariance structures (e.g., Compound Symmetry, 
Variance Components, Unstructured, AR1-Heterogeneous) either failed to converge or resulted 
in a higher AIC. AR1 assumes that surveys completed nearest in time to one another correlate 
more highly than surveys completed at more distal times.  
CHAPTER III 
Results 
Sample Characteristics, Frequencies, and Bivariate Correlations 
The sample characteristics indicated that, on average, the participants reported 
themselves as experiencing moderate levels of GAD symptoms. The mean for the sample 
surpasses the initial cut score (5.7; Newman et al., 2002) but not an updated cut score (7.67; 
Moore, Anderson, Barnes, Haigh, & Fresco, 2014) that indicates probable GAD diagnosis. This 
suggests the present sample has somewhat elevated GAD symptoms. Additionally, the sample’s 
mean CES-D score is equal to the revised cut score (≥ 20) that suggests mild depression (Vilagut 
et al., 2016). Across means of the L1 variables, the participants showed a tendency toward 




to report experiencing slightly high valence and slightly low arousal (i.e., slightly calm). The 
average reporting of high valence is consistent with trends seen in previous repeated-measures 
studies, whereas participants in other studies tended to report themselves as experiencing a mild 
degree of affective arousal (e.g., Cain, Meehan, Roche, Clarkin, & De Panfilis, 2019; Smyth, 
Zawadzki, Juth, Sciamanna, 2017). Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and 
bivariate correlations for each study variable. To better understand trait-level tendencies for each 
participant across all the surveys, I obtained the range, minimum, and maximum of all 
participant means for each L1. Next, frequencies of ratings on each dimension were obtained. 
The frequencies showed that within each dimension, independent of the other two dimensions, 
participants reported the most instances of neutral dominance, high affiliation, and high moral 
interpersonal behaviors (Table 2). Participants reported perceiving the least number of instances 
of low dominance (submission), low affiliative (cold), and immoral behaviors. Therefore, these 
sample characteristics support the decision to person-center the L1 predictors as well as outcome 
variables to control for each participant’s average ratings on each variable.  
Bivariate Pearson’s correlations were conducted between participants’ means on all L1 
variables, GAD-Q-IV score, and CES-D score (Table 1). Intraclass Correlation Coefficients 
(ICC) were calculated for each variable to identify the amount of within-person variability 
present for each L1 variable. The ICCs were small and ranged from .12 to .17, which indicated 
that 12% to 17% of the variance was between-person and 88% to 83% of the variability was 
within-person, respectively. These patterns of variability are consistent with prior studies that 
utilized perceptions of others’ interpersonal behavior (e.g., Sadikaj et al., 2013). Consequently, 
the greater within-person variability in the present study justified conducting MLM to examine 




Direct Effects of GAD Symptoms on Arousal, Valence, and Perceptions of Others’ 
Dominant, Cold, and Immoral Behavior 
Hypotheses 1a-c and 2a-b pertained to the between-person fixed effect of GAD symptom 
level on each of the L1 variables, separately. Five MLMs were conducted with GAD-Q-IV score 
predicting each L1 variable while controlling for both gender and CES-D score. Continuous 
predictor variables were grand mean-centered so that parameters reflect effects of deviations 
above the sample average level of GAD symptoms (and depression). Table 3 shows the fixed 
effects of gender, depression symptoms, and GAD symptoms, and the random intercept 
predicting each of the L1 variables. 
The results showed that the random intercepts were significant in every model, thus 
indicating that L1 outcomes varied across participants. The effect of gender was non-significant 
in every model (p’s > .497). Contrary to hypotheses, there were no significant predictors of 
others’ dominant behavior (p’s > .521) nor of valence (p’s > .504). Contrary to hypotheses, 
higher levels of GAD symptoms predicted both lower perceptions of others’ cold behavior and 
lower perceptions of immoral behavior. Unexpectedly, GAD symptoms did not predict arousal, 
valence, or perceptions of others’ dominant behavior, whereas higher depression symptoms 
predicted higher arousal and marginally higher perceptions of cold behavior. Finally, all the 
effects fell below the MDES at the present study’s level of power for detecting L2 direct effects 
(.27; Arend & Schafer, 2019). Consequently, I must consider the possibility that the significant 
effects of GAD symptoms predicting perceived cold behavior and perceived immoral behavior 
may be ‘false positives’. In addition, the remaining null effects may have failed to be detected 




Direct Effects of Perceptions of Dominant, Cold, and Immoral Behavior on Arousal and 
Valence 
Four MLMs were conducted to predict arousal and valence when including all main 
effects (between- and within-person) and interactions. Each outcome was tested in a stepwise 
manner with the main effects entered in the first block and GAD interaction effects entered in the 
second block. The effect of gender was non-significant for all MLMs and therefore is not 
discussed further, but the effect is still presented in Tables 4 and 5. Furthermore, only the results 
of block 2 for each MLM are presented in the following sections, unless otherwise noted. 
Predicting Arousal 
The results (see Table 4) showed not only significant variability in intercepts but also in 
slopes between predictors and arousal. Contrary to hypothesis 2a, GAD symptoms did not 
predict arousal. Furthermore, the standardized effect size fell below the MDES for a L2 direct 
effect. Unexpectedly, depression symptoms predicted higher arousal with a small effect size (~ 
.10). Contrary to hypothesis 3a, mean perceived dominant behavior did not predict arousal. 
Furthermore, this effect fell below the MDES for a L1 direct effect. As hypothesized, mean 
perceived cold behavior predicted higher arousal (H4a) with a medium effect size. Contrary to 
hypothesis 5a, mean perceived immoral behavior predicted lower arousal in block 1. When the 
interaction terms were included (block 2), mean perceived immoral behavior only predicted 
marginally lower arousal. Although the effect size for this latter result was small, the present 
study had sufficient power to detect this effect.  
Regarding within-person effects, contrary to hypothesis 3c, person-centered perceived 
dominant behavior predicted lower arousal. As hypothesized, person-centered perceived cold 




and H5c, respectively). Each of these standardized effect sizes were small, and the latter result 
fell below the MDES for a L1 direct effect. 
Surprisingly, the results showed that none of interaction effects of GAD symptoms with 
mean social perceptions or person-mean centered perceptions were statistically significant (p’s > 
.115). Therefore, hypotheses 6a, 6c, 7a, 7c, 8a, and 8c were not supported. There was a small 
effect size for the interaction between GAD symptoms with person-centered perceived immoral 
behavior. However, all of these results fell below the MDES.  
Predicting Valence 
Significant variability in intercepts and all slopes confirmed differences between 
participants’ average valence and within-person associations of perceptions and valence. 
Contrary to hypothesis 2b, GAD symptoms did not predict valence, nor did depression 
symptoms. Additionally, both effect sizes were small and fell below the MDES for L2 direct 
effects. As hypothesized, mean perceptions of dominant, cold, and immoral behavior each 
predicted lower valence (H3b, H4b, and H5b, respectively) with small (mean perceived 
dominant behavior) to medium effect sizes (mean perceived cold and immoral behaviors). 
However, the effect size of mean perceived dominant behavior fell below the MDES. In 
addition, person-centered perceptions of dominant, cold, and immoral behavior each predicted 
lower valence with small (perceptions of dominant behavior) to medium (perceptions of cold and 
immoral behaviors) effect sizes, thus supporting hypotheses 3d, 4d, and 5d, respectively. Each of 
these L1 direct effects met or exceeded the MDES. 
Regarding the interaction effects, GAD did not moderate mean dominance in predicting 
valence. Therefore, hypothesis 7b was not supported. Furthermore, GAD did not moderate any 




support hypotheses 6d, 7d, and 8d. These CLI effect sizes were also very small (> .03). However, 
GAD symptoms showed a significant and small-sized CLI with average ratings of others cold 
behavior. Simple slopes follow up analyses showed that, contrary to hypothesis 7d, GAD 
symptoms buffered the relationship between perceived cold behavior and valence (Figure 5). For 
participants with low levels of GAD symptoms, one’s average perceptions of others’ cold 
behavior predicted lower valence (b = -24.17, SE = 5.44,  p < .001, 95%CI [-34.92, -13.43]). In 
contrast, individuals with high levels of GAD symptoms showed no relationship between 
average ratings of cold behavior and valence (b = -1.29, SE = 5.26, p = .806, 95% CI [-11.69, 
9.10]). Furthermore, compared to low GAD symptom participants, individuals with high GAD 
symptoms reported lower valence at all levels of perceived affiliative-cold behavior. Figure 5 
shows a plot of the simple slopes analysis.  
Figure 5 
 
Plot of simple slopes analysis – GAD symptoms buffering the relationship between mean 





There was also a statistically significant interaction between GAD symptoms and average 
perceived immoral behavior in predicting valence. This result also had a small standardized 
effect size. As hypothesized, GAD symptoms strengthened the relationship between perceived 
immoral behavior and valence (H8d). Simple slopes follow up analysis revealed that at low 
levels of GAD symptoms the relationship between average perceived immoral behavior and 
valence was not significant (b = -4.39, SE = 5.36, t = -.82, p = .41, 95%CI [-14.97, 6.19]). At 
high levels of GAD symptoms, perceived immoral behavior predicted lower valence (b = -23.24, 
SE = 4.79, p < .001, 95% CI [-32.71, -13.77]). Figure 6 shows a plot of the simple slope analysis 
of the interaction between GAD symptoms and mean perceived immoral behavior predicting 
valence. 
Figure 6  
 
Plot of simple slopes analysis – GAD symptoms strengthening the relationship between mean 





When considered together these results indicate that participants who reported higher 
average ratings of dominant, cold, and immoral behaviors tended to report lower valence. When 
participants’ ratings of dominant, cold, and immoral behavior deviated above their own means, 
they reported additional decreases in valence. However, perceptions of others as cold predict 
lower valence only for low-GAD participants, whereas perceived immorality predicted lower 
valence most strongly for high-GAD participants. Said differently, GAD buffered the 
relationship between average ratings of cold behavior and valence, whereas GAD strengthened 




Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of the present study was to examine effects of perceptions of others’ 
interpersonal behaviors on self-reported affective reaction over the course of naturalistic self-
reported interpersonal interactions, and the extent to which GAD symptoms moderated these 
effects. Specifically, individuals with higher GAD symptoms were expected to report higher 
arousal and lower valence when perceiving behaviors conceptualized as interpersonal threats, at 
both the between-person and within-person levels. Perceptions of others’ interpersonal behaviors 
were divided into the three dimensions of dominance, affiliation, and morality. The interpersonal 
behaviors were based on the two existing IPC dimensions (dominance and affiliation) and a 
hypothesized third dimension (morality). Affective reaction was comprised of arousal and 
valence, the two orthogonal axes of the affect grid. It was theorized that dominant, low affiliative 
(cold), and immoral interpersonal behaviors might function as interpersonal threats, which would 




participants. Furthermore, GAD was hypothesized to predict more instances of each 
interpersonal threat and the associated responses, as well as to strengthen these relationships.  
Major Findings 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder Symptoms Predicting Social Perceptions 
Contrary to hypotheses, GAD symptoms did not predict perceptions of dominance. This 
finding is inconsistent with the literature, as previous studies have found that individuals with 
GAD tend to perceive others’ behavior as dominant, cold, and cold-dominant (Newman & 
Erickson, 2010; Erickson & Pincus, 2005). For example, within contrived laboratory social 
interactions with a confederate, participants with GAD symptoms perceived the confederate as 
more blaming, controlling, attacking, and ignoring, and less loving, trusting, and connecting 
(Erickson & Pincus, 2005). However, findings regarding the “pathoplasticity” or heterogeneity 
of interpersonal problems among people with GAD (Girard et al., 2017; Gomez Penedo, 
Constantino, Coyne, Westra, & Antony, 2017; Przeworski et al., 2011; Salzer et al., 2008) 
suggest that interpersonal heterogeneity may obscure any single relationship between GAD 
symptoms and perceived dominance. Assuming this is true, then perhaps an effect may have 
emerged in the present study if the participants with high GAD symptoms were grouped 
according to their predominant interpersonal problems (i.e., intrusive type, exploitable type, cold 
type, and nonassertive type; Przeworski et al., 2011).  
Alternatively, perhaps differences in the study context contributed to the present results. 
Previous research has assessed interpersonal problems by examining in-vivo laboratory self-
reports while interacting with confederates (Erickson & Newman, 2007) or with self-report 
questionnaires of trait interpersonal problems at one (Girard et al., 2017; Przeworski et al., 




present study measured perceptions of interpersonal behaviors across 30 naturalistic social 
interactions, which might “wash out” effects of particular stressors given the broad range of 
possible situations assessed. It is also possible that participants in the present study reported on 
more interactions with friends and acquaintances, rather than strangers (this information was 
captured but not analyzed in the present study), which may have affected the results. In addition, 
as discussed further below, the individuals with GAD symptoms reported greater perceptions of 
affiliative and moral behavior. If they experienced their interacting partners as affiliative and 
moral, perhaps this was associated with less apparent dominance among the participants’ 
interacting partners. Although additional research is needed to replicate a null finding with 
respect to perceived dominance among individuals with GAD symptoms, it is possible that 
individuals with GAD symptoms may be sensitive to perceived dominance, but only with certain 
people.  
Contrary to hypotheses, GAD symptoms predicted higher, rather than lower, perceived 
affiliative behavior. In addition, the effect size fell below the MDES for a L2 direct effect (.27; 
Arend & Schafer, 2019), meaning that the current study was not amply powered to accurately 
detect this effect and thus this finding should be interpreted with caution, as it may be a false 
positive. Despite power concerns, the finding is inconsistent with the literature. As mentioned 
above, some studies found individuals with GAD symptoms to perceive others in a manner that 
is interpersonally threatening (i.e., cold and controlling; Erickson & Pincus, 2005; Newman & 
Erickson, 2010), which is what I hypothesized would occur for individuals with GAD symptoms 
across naturalistic interpersonal interactions. However, past research has largely relied on self-
reported generalized perceptions of threats and on one-time lab studies. Given our divergent 




present study tended to surround themselves with others with whom they can be affiliative 
because it is more reassuring (i.e., avoiding individuals they perceive as unaffiliative). Indeed, 
prior research has shown that individuals with GAD reported engaging in higher levels of 
reassurance seeking as a safety behavior to control their worrying, uncertainty, or anxiety 
(Beesdo-Baum et al., 2012; Cougle et al., 2011), even pulling for reassurance from confederates 
within a laboratory task (Erickson & Newman, 2007). Therefore, the higher levels of perceived 
affiliative behaviors among individuals with high GAD symptoms may reflect this interpersonal 
coping strategy. An alternate interpretation is that perhaps worriers use appraisals of affiliation as 
a means of anxiety avoidance. If perceiving others’ cold behavior (which may threaten lack of 
belongingness) or neutral behavior (which may trigger intolerance of uncertainty; Holaway, 
Heimberg, & Coles, 2006; Lee et al., 2010) is threatening, it may be that individuals with GAD 
symptoms appraise cold and neutral behavior as affiliative to avoid experiencing anxiety and 
uncertainty.  
Contrary to hypotheses, GAD positively predicted higher, rather than lower, perceptions 
of moral behavior. This effect also fell below Arend and Schafer’s (2019) MDES for a L2 direct 
effect (.27), thus warranting caution when interpreting this result. Still, the result is partially 
inconsistent with the literature. It did not align with the notion that GAD would be associated 
with higher instances of perceiving threats to moral contamination. However, this result does fit 
with the notion that individuals with GAD are prone to excessive reassurance seeking (Beesdo-
Baum et al., 2012; Cougle et al., 2011). If this is so, then the person with GAD symptoms may 
perceive the reassuring person’s behavior as cooperative, which is an act that previous research 
has shown that humans generally consider moral (Curry, Mullins, & Whitehouse, 2019). 




behavior, perhaps the higher appraisals of moral behavior also functioned as anxiety avoidance; 
worriers tended to appraise immoral and neutral behavior as moral to avoid perceiving a threat or 
sparking uncertainty, respectively. 
With respect to the conceptualization of perceived interpersonal threats, both significant 
main effects – GAD predicting high affiliative behavior and high moral behavior – were in the 
opposite direction from what was hypothesized. However, in some regards, these results may be 
consistent with previous research. For instance, individuals with GAD often tend to report 
interpersonal problems with being too affiliative (Erickson et al., 2016; Shin & Newman, 2019; 
Zainal & Newman, 2017). In addition, Erickson and colleagues (2018) found that individuals 
with GAD tended to rate themselves as higher in compassionate motivations and Hebert and 
colleagues (2014) identified that worriers tend to hold the belief that worrying is a moral action. 
The present results in combination with previous studies might suggest a propensity of worriers 
to hold a bias toward appraising interpersonal stimuli as affiliative and moral, whether in 
themselves or others. For instance, Shin and Newman (2019) found that individuals with GAD 
over-reported themselves as behaving in affiliative ways, whereas informants reported the GAD 
individuals were less affiliative. The prior findings about worriers appraising their own behaviors 
as affiliative and moral may extend also to how they appraise others’ behaviors. Clearly, 
additional research is needed to better understand these discrepancies in naturalistic interpersonal 
interactions.  
Generalized Anxiety Disorder Symptoms Predicting Affective Arousal and Valence  
Contrary to hypotheses, GAD symptoms did not predict arousal. This is inconsistent with 
the literature. The diagnostic criteria of GAD includes somatic symptoms associated with 




in individuals with GAD symptoms (Ottaviani et al., 2014; Stapinski et al., 2010; Hoffman et al., 
2005; Aldao, Mennin, & McLaughlin, 2013; Aldao et al., 2010). However, given that worry in 
GAD has been theorized in some cases to help individuals avoid arousal (Borkovec, Alcaine, & 
Behar, 2004) or perhaps more precisely to help them avoid additional increases in arousal (i.e., a 
negative contrast; Newman & Llera, 2011), perhaps the present results are evidence of successful 
attempts by individuals with GAD symptoms to maintain consistent negative affective states in 
order to avoid further expected increase in negative mood (e.g., negative emotional contrasts). 
This is consistent with prior research showing that more intense worrying throughout daily life 
predicted higher sustained arousal over the next hour (Newman et al, 2019). Said differently, if 
the participants in the present study were already in a chronically aroused state that did not vary 
in response to others’ interpersonal behaviors, then the present null finding may indicate they 
successfully suppressed increases in arousal during interactions. However, I would still have 
expected to find worriers reporting higher arousal across interactions. Despite these effects of 
GAD symptoms, depression symptoms predicted higher arousal with a large enough effect size 
to exceed post-hoc MDES (see Arend & Schafer, 2019). This significant covariate effect 
indicates that, if worriers had been experiencing increased arousal, they would likely have 
reported it. However, additional research is needed to disentangle the effects of daily worry on 
subsequent interpersonal interactions.   
While not the focus of the present study, the covariate depression predicted higher 
arousal, even after controlling for the effects of GAD and social perceptions. This effect was 
surprising given that depression has been associated with decreased arousal to negative stimuli 
(Rosebrock et al., 2016) and perceived threats (Yancey et al., 2014). Perhaps when controlling 




remaining effect of depression symptoms likely reflected primarily low positive affect (Gençöz, 
2002).  
 Contrary to hypotheses, GAD symptoms did not predict lower valence across social 
interactions. This is inconsistent with the literature and inconsistent with the previous results. For 
instance, GAD has been associated with elevated negative affect, even after successful attempts 
at coping and reduction in negative affect (Fitzgerald et al., 2017), however this pattern did not 
show up in the present results. If the individuals with GAD symptoms are perceiving more 
affiliative and moral behavior then we might also expect them to feel higher valence.  
Perceived Dominant Behavior Predicting Affect 
Contrary to hypotheses, mean perceptions of dominant behavior did not predict arousal. 
However, as hypothesized, participants who reported higher mean (chronic) perceptions of 
dominant behavior reported lower valence. This result is partially consistent with the literature. 
However, it must be noted that the literature also appears to be mixed regarding the relationship 
between dominance and arousal and valence. The non-significant correlation between perceived 
dominance and arousal and valence is consistent with prior research (Cain et al., 2019; Killgore, 
1998), but the null effect of dominance on arousal stands in contrast to past findings that show 
interacting with a dominant person tends to increase autonomic nervous system activity 
(Cordonier, Breton, Trouche, & Van der Henst, 2017). Other research has shown that, people 
who identify with submissive interaction partners tend to report lower valence when perceiving 
dominance (Demaree, Robinson, Everhart, & Youngstrom, 2005). In one study, when 
individuals self-identified as possessing dominant traits, then they reported lower valence when 
engaged in submissive behaviors; however, participants who identified as possessing submissive 




Another study by Stevanovic, Henttonen, Kahri, and Koski (2019) found differential 
effects of dominance on same-sex interacting partners. Importantly, they found that dominance 
showed an effect on reported arousal only during the beginning of the social encounter. This 
highlights an important limitation of the present study. Participants reported retrospectively on 
social interactions, the recall of which were likely to be influenced by peak and end effects 
(Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, & Redelmeier, 1993; Stone, Broderick, Kaell, DelesPaul, & 
Porter, 2000), meaning that I would expect participants to base their recollections on the peak 
affect experienced and how they felt at the end of the interactions. However, if perceived 
dominance exerts influence largely at the commencement of an interaction, then participants 
would be less likely to remember these details, thus contributing to the null effect of perceived 
dominance on reported arousal. Alternatively, the effect of dominance on valence was found 
primarily with the female participants (Stevanovic et al., 2019); valence increased when the 
interacting partner exhibited greater dominance in an interaction, whereas valence decreased 
when the participant felt they needed to exert more dominance during the interaction. Given that 
the present sample consisted predominantly of female participants, the effect of perceived 
dominance on valence may parallel that found by Stevanovic and colleagues. 
Contrary to hypotheses, within-person increases in perceived dominance predicted lower, 
rather than higher, arousal. However, as hypothesized, within-person increases in perceived 
dominance predicted lower valence. These findings are inconsistent with the results of other 
recent studies. For instance, dominant behavior has been shown to increase physiological arousal 
during interactions (Cordonier et al., 2017). In another study, Cain and colleagues (2019) found 
that participants were more likely to behave in a friendly (communal & dominant) manner when 




Alternatively, perhaps low arousal and low valence implies that the participants 
experienced a different emotion, rather than fear or anxiety, in response to perceived dominant 
behavior. For instance, Hepach, Kliemann, Grüneisen, Heekeren, and Dziobek (2011) classified 
62 emotions in relation to their scores on arousal and valence as well as their frequency in 
everyday conversations. They found five emotions that were comprised of both low arousal and 
low valence: boredom, compassion, embarrassment, melancholia, and humility. Interestingly, 
each of these emotions were found to have similar frequencies experienced throughout daily life, 
except for humility, which had lower daily frequency than the other emotions. Accordingly, the 
affective response observed in the present study may reflect the experience of one of these 
emotions in response to perceiving dominant behavior. However, future research is needed to 
better understand a lower arousal and lower valence response to perceived dominant behavior.  
I had conceptualized perceived dominance as an interpersonal threat, which was 
theorized to result in within-person increases in arousal and decreases in valence. However, the 
present results suggest that participants may have been more sensitive to perceived submissive 
behavior, about which they may have felt excited (high arousal and high valence). Or perhaps, 
the participants may have felt embarrassed (decreased arousal and decreased valence; Hepach et 
al., 2011) when perceiving dominant behavior. 
It is also noteworthy that the mean or “aggregate” effects differed slightly from the 
within-person fluctuations in response to perceived dominant behavior. The lower valence in 
response to perceived dominance was consistent at both the between- and within-person levels. 
However, the mean (between-person) effects of perceived dominance did not result in any 
change in arousal, whereas the state (within-person) effects resulted in lower arousal, which was 




when interacting frequently with dominant interaction partners, and perhaps the within-person 
effect reflected the experience of embarrassment in response to being confronted with dominant 
behavior.  
Perceived Cold Behavior Predicting Affect 
As hypothesized, higher average perceptions of cold behavior predicted higher arousal 
and lower valence. Similarly, as hypothesized, higher within-person increases in perceived cold 
behavior predicted both higher arousal and lower valence. These results support the theory that 
cold behaviors function as interpersonal threats, both generally and within specific interactions.  
The between-person effects suggest that experiencing colder social interactions on 
average may be associated with lack of belongingness and social connectedness. While 
experiencing social connection has been linked with mental wellness (Seppala, Rossomondo, & 
Doty, 2013), the lack thereof is a risk factor for mental illness symptoms (Saeri, Cruwys, Barlow, 
Stronge, & Sibley, 2018) including anxiety, depression, substance use, and maladaptive attitudes 
toward food (Richardson, Elliott, & Roberts, 2017). The reciprocal has also been shown, that 
mental health symptoms predicted subsequent lack of social connectedness (Saeri et al., 2018).  
The within-person effects suggest that when in interactions, perceiving colder behaviors 
results in an increase in arousal and decreased valence. Therefore, it may be experienced as an 
acute interpersonal threat to belongingness when the other individual behaves in a cold way. 
Alternatively, the effect of affiliative behavior resulting in lower arousal and higher valence may 
indicate that participants felt reassured (comforted) by others behaving warmly. Indeed, research 
and theory points to the seriousness of social connectedness such that individuals with low social 
connectedness have a higher incidence of depression, generalized anxiety, suicidal ideation, 




Therefore, perceiving behaviors that threaten belongingness or social connectedness may quite 
literally pose a threat to one’s well-being and life.  
Despite these interpretations that supported the theorized conceptualization of 
interpersonal threat, it is also possible that interactions evoked alternate states, such as guilt, 
shame, or anger when reporting their affect. If this is so, then it implies variations in the meaning 
ascribed to perceived behaviors that might contribute to different affective state (Mu & 
Berenbaum, 2019). This limitation is due to the affect grid only measuring higher-order affective 
classifications rather than discrete emotions. Therefore, a replication of the present study might 
utilize measures of several discrete emotions to examine whether perceiving cold interpersonal 
behavior does indeed contribute to the affective experience of threat (i.e., fear, anxiety) as 
opposed to other negatively-valenced social emotions such as guilt or shame.  
Perceived Immoral Behavior Predicting Affect 
Contrary to hypotheses, mean perceptions of immoral behavior marginally predicted 
lower arousal. This effect may reflect participants having become habituated to perceiving 
others’ immoral behavior. Alternatively, a similar effect has been shown in participants 
exhibiting decreased arousal when perceiving another person’s pain, if that person was judged as 
immoral (Cui, Ma, & Luo, 2016). The effect was theorized to differentiate instances in which it 
is least threatening to experience empathy for others’ plight, when the person is perceived as 
moral. If the person is judged to be immoral, they may not be trustworthy and thus empathizing 
with their pain may be risky.  
As hypothesized, mean perceptions of immoral behavior predicted lower valence. 
Perhaps these effects reflect, on average, that perceiving more immoral behavior contributed to 




2011). The converse of these effects is also noteworthy, such that participants may have felt joy, 
admiration, gratitude, or moral elevation (characterized by positive affect; Algoe & Haidt, 2009) 
such that being around others who engaged in moral behaviors may have contributed to the 
participants feeling generally uplifted.  
As hypothesized, within-person increases in perceived immoral behavior predicted both 
higher arousal and lower valence. Taken together, these within-person effects suggest that 
perceiving low moral behavior is more interpersonally threatening during social interactions 
since they predicted higher arousal and lower valence. This fits with the conceptualization of 
immoral behavior functioning as threats of moral contamination. Alternatively, interacting with 
someone engaging in moral behavior may be reassuring which decreases arousal and increases 
valence.  
Interestingly, the between- and within-person effects of perceived immoral behavior on 
arousal differed such that average perceived immoral behavior predicted marginally lower 
arousal whereas state perceived immoral behavior predicted increased arousal. In contrast, 
immoral behavior at both the between- and within-person levels predicted lower valence. 
Perhaps these differences may reflect that at the trait level immoral behavior may have 
contributed to the experience of embarrassment (low arousal and low valence; Hepach et al., 
2011), whereas at the state level perceiving immoral behavior contributed to the experience of 
interpersonal threat. Despite these interpretations, it is again noted that the affect grid measures a 
higher-order categorization of emotion and does not lend itself to parsing apart specific emotions 
– such as fear, guilt, or shame – that participants may have experienced that resulted in similar 
ratings on the affect grid but arise from alternate interpretations of the same kind of behavior and 




Random Intercepts and Slopes Predicting Arousal and Valence 
 As hypothesized, the random effects of person-mean centered perceived dominant, cold, 
and immoral behavior showed significant variance across participants in predicting arousal and 
valence. Said differently, each participant had their own mean level of arousal and valence as 
well as their own pattern of fluctuations in response to perceived dominant, cold, and immoral 
behaviors. These findings are consistent with the literature. Each person is expected to have their 
own average level of affect (Schwartz & Stone, 1998; Tiede, 2019) and perceptions of behavior 
(e.g., Wright et al., 2017).  
Generalized Anxiety Disorder Symptoms Moderating the Relationship Between Perceived 
Interpersonal Behaviors and Arousal 
Contrary to hypotheses, GAD did not moderate any of the relationships between average 
perceptions of dominant, cold, or immoral behaviors predicting arousal. In addition, GAD did 
not moderate any of the within-person fluctuations in person-centered perceived dominant, cold, 
or immoral behavior predicting arousal. These results are consistent with the prior result reported 
earlier – the main effect of GAD symptoms did not predict arousal – but are inconsistent with the 
literature on GAD. The diagnostic criteria for GAD includes symptoms involving physiological 
arousal (e.g., feeling on edge, difficulty concentrating, muscle tension; APA, 2013). Moreover, 
research on GAD has frequently shown that it includes heightened physiological arousal 
(Ottaviani et al., 2014; Stapinski et al., 2010; Hoffman et al., 2005; Aldao, Mennin, & 
McLaughlin, 2013; Aldao et al., 2010). However, other studies have shown that GAD symptoms 
predicted lower arousal symptoms suggesting that worry functions to suppress increases in 




found no moderating effect of GAD on the relationship between social perceptions and affective 
arousal. 
However, there are alternate interpretations that may explain the present results. First, 
perhaps the arousal experienced by individuals who worry occurs largely outside of interpersonal 
interactions. Indeed, the DSM-5 states that individuals with GAD tend to worry more about 
ongoing relationships rather than negative evaluation within social interactions, thus 
differentiating it from social anxiety disorder (APA, 2013). Second, perhaps these results lend 
support to the theory that situation-specific factors are better predictors of behavior (in this case 
arousal) than are traits (e.g., Mischel & Shoda, 1995). For instance, perhaps GAD did not 
influence appraisals of others’ behaviors and the resultant affect, or perhaps the three 
interpersonal domains assessed (dominance, affiliation, and morality) are not particularly salient 
to individuals with GAD symptoms with respect to their reported level of arousal. However, this 
is unlikely because the IPC dimensions dominance and affiliation have been shown to be trans-
diagnostic, and previous research has shown that worriers report behaviors that vary in 
dominance and affiliation (Erickson & Newman, 2007; Erickson et al., 2016).  
Third, we did not measure arousal related specifically to GAD symptoms. Instead we 
chose to utilize the affect grid because it is a single item measure of affect that reduces 
participant burden across multiple surveys. This permitted the assessment of affective arousal 
more generally, which was assumed to be applicable to all the participants regardless of 
psychiatric diagnoses. However, perhaps a measure that is targeted specifically to physiological 
arousal related to GAD should be used in future research. Perhaps such a measure would be 





For instance, Sadikaj and colleagues (2013) asked participants to rate the degree to which 
they responded with 12 a-priori specified behaviors during social interactions. Scott and 
colleagues (2017) asked participants whether they had perceived specific behaviors (i.e., 
rejection, criticism) and responded with specific urges or behaviors (i.e., aggressive or 
threatening behavior). As such, these authors’ measures of affect and behaviors were more 
directly relevant to their target population, whereas the present study permitted participants to 
rate their perceptions using three Likert scales and freely indicate their affective arousal and 
valence on the affect grid. 
Fourth, perhaps the present results provide evidence that GAD is not associated with 
affective arousal in interpersonal interaction, whereas another trait variable would. For instance, 
considering that the covariate depression showed a significant direct effect on arousal, perhaps 
depression is a trait variable that would moderate these relationships between social perceptions 
and arousal. Future research should investigate this. If findings support that, then it would add to 
the literature on the differential state-level effects of different types of symptoms (i.e., depressive 
versus anxiety).  
Generalized Anxiety Disorder Symptoms Moderating the Relationship Between Perceived 
Interpersonal Behaviors and Valence 
Contrary to hypotheses, GAD did not moderate the relationship between average 
perceptions of dominant behavior predicting valence. This result is inconsistent with the 
literature. Prior studies have shown that individuals with GAD tend to perceive others’ behavior 
as cold and dominant (Erickson & Newman, 2007). As discussed previously, perhaps 
interpersonal pathoplasticity among individuals with GAD symptoms (e.g., Przeworski et al., 




Contrary to hypotheses, GAD symptoms buffered the relationship between average levels 
of cold behaviors and valence. While the moderating effect of GAD was significant, it was in the 
opposite direction from what was predicted. Participants with high GAD symptoms reported an 
equally low valence regardless of their average perceptions of cold (or affiliative) behaviors. In 
addition, participants with high GAD symptoms reported overall lower valence than did 
participants with low GAD symptoms. Alternatively, for participants who reported low levels of 
GAD symptoms, valence was negatively related to average perceptions of cold behavior, such 
that participants with low average perceptions of cold behavior reported higher valence than 
participants with high average perceptions of cold behavior. Although this effect was not 
hypothesized, it suggests that higher GAD symptoms were related to lower valence and no 
differences in valence between average affiliative versus distancing behavior. Said differently, 
GAD symptoms appeared to dampen the overall effect of perceiving more affiliative behaviors 
on valence such that these individuals do not experience increases in positive affect from 
associating more frequently with affiliative people. This result is consistent with research on 
social disconnection in that mere socializing does not necessarily meet the need for 
belongingness and connection, but rather that close relationships in which one can confide are 
more pertinent (see Seppala et al., 2013 for a review). While no studies were found that 
examined the relationship between social disconnection and GAD, Cruwys and colleagues 
(2014) found that belonging to a valued social group decreased depression symptoms over time, 
and to a lesser extent decreased anxiety symptoms. Perhaps the present findings suggest that 
individuals with GAD symptoms may too experience greater difficulties feeling connected with 
others, particularly if the GAD symptoms contribute to low valence regardless of how affiliative 




(Newman & Llera, 2011). Participants with high GAD symptoms may have worried to maintain 
low valence as to avoid being surprised by a sudden, unexpected shift in their emotional state. 
 As hypothesized, GAD symptoms strengthened the relationship between average 
perceptions of immoral behavior and valence. Participants with high levels of GAD symptoms 
differed in their level of valence based on their average perceptions of immoral behavior; 
individuals who perceived more immoral behavior reported lower valence than individuals who 
perceived more moral behavior. However, participants who endorsed low levels of GAD 
symptoms reported low valence, regardless of how moral they perceived others’ behavior on 
average. The individuals with lower GAD symptoms did not differ in levels of reported valence 
between high and low mean perceptions of immoral behavior. However, GAD symptoms 
contributed to being more susceptible to feeling worse when perceiving immoral behavior. Such 
a sensitivity to the morality of others’ behavior resembles scrupulosity or may reflect the 
consequences of having been raised in a family in which sensitivity to moral behaviors was 
highly reinforced, even to the point of leading to anxiety from “overactive sensitivities” to moral 
concerns (Miller & Hedges, 2008, p. 1048). Indeed, comorbidity between scrupulosity OCD and 
GAD have been found to be just under 20% (Rasmussen, Siev, Abramovitch, & Wilhelm, 2016). 
Sample characteristics may have also contributed to this finding, as the participants were 
undergraduates from a private, religious university. Therefore, the likelihood of the worried 
participants having been reared with “overactive sensitivities” to moral behaviors is increased 
compared to a secular university or community sample.  
 It is noteworthy that the moderating effects of GAD with mean cold behavior differed 
from the moderating effect with mean immoral behavior in predicting valence. GAD symptoms 




the effect of perceiving moral behavior. The non-worried participants who engaged primarily in 
interactions with people whose behavior they perceived as warm reported feeling best (on 
average) compared to all other non-worried participants. In contrast, worried participants who 
interacted mostly with moral people reported feeling better than all the other worried 
participants. These results could reflect differences in psychological needs between worried and 
non-worried individuals. As worry severity increases, people may have more difficulty 
experiencing relatedness and belongingness with others. In addition, high worry may include 
concerns about feeling unsafe with others unless surrounded by people whom the worrier 
determines to be trustworthy and a positive influence (i.e., are perceived to exhibit high moral 
behavior). Another possible synthesis of these discrepant findings may be explained as a function 
of intolerance of uncertainty interacting with perceived trustworthiness. Research has shown that 
worriers are particularly sensitive to uncertainty and thus worry is an attempt to generate more 
control (Holaway et al, 2006; Lee et al., 2010). Social interactions are replete with uncertainties 
(e.g., not knowing whether a person’s motives are benign or malicious), regardless of the level of 
affiliativeness (or coldness) of the other person’s behavior. Consequently, the individual with 
GAD symptoms must navigate these uncertainties, which may result in experiencing low valence 
in response to both others’ affiliative and cold behaviors if the worrier is concerned the other 
person’s intent has negative implications for the worrier. Alternatively, appraising another 
person as trustworthy (i.e., interpreting their intent as benign), based on their moral behaviors, 
may increase certainty within an interaction thus increasing a sense of safety and therefore 
positive affect in individuals with GAD symptoms. Then perhaps individuals with high GAD 
symptoms who interacted more frequently with trustworthy people felt better than those 




uncertainty nor trustworthiness were measured in the present study, therefore additional research 
is needed to test these interpretations.  
These differing effects further justify examining moral components of GAD apart from 
merely the affiliative (i.e., social) components of GAD. Furthermore, the present results provide 
additional support that affiliation and morality are two distinct dimensions with unique functions 
within interpersonal interactions and may interact differently with different trait variables, like 
worry. Future research should further explore the relationship between morality and GAD, 
especially regarding moral behavior as a perpetuating factor as well as a protective factor.  
 Lastly, contrary to hypotheses GAD symptoms did not moderate the relationships 
between state fluctuations in perceived dominant, cold, or immoral behavior in predicting 
valence. Given the present pattern of results, GAD symptoms behaved only like an individual 
difference variable explaining trait differences in perceptions of others’ behaviors and valence. 
However, GAD did not appear to influence state-level patterns of affective responses to 
perceived interpersonal behaviors. Perhaps the state-level changes in perceptions were not 
specific enough to GAD symptoms, whereas a variable like perceptions of negative contrasts 
(see Llera & Newman, 2010) may be more likely to be endorsed by individuals with GAD 
symptoms.    
Implications 
Clinical Implications 
The present results have implications for existing interpersonal models of GAD. 
Although previous research has shown broadly that GAD symptoms are associated with 
perceptions of others as cold and dominant in a brief interaction with strangers (Erickson & 




naturalistic social interactions. Firstly, the present study found no effect of GAD symptoms 
predicting perceptions of dominant behavior. Second, compared to participants who endorsed 
low levels of GAD symptoms, those with high levels of GAD symptoms appeared to show more 
sensitivity to the (im)morality of others’ behavior and less sensitivity to others’ affiliative (or 
distancing) behavior. As mentioned previously, the interaction with affiliation is aligned with the 
contrast avoidance model (CAM) of GAD (Newman & Llera, 2011). Furthermore, the present 
results might imply that perhaps negative contrasts are not experienced as equally threatening. 
For instance, within the CAM framework, the risk of rejection or lack of belongingness (i.e., low 
affiliation) from others appeared to be more threatening than the (im)morality of others’ 
behavior. Consequently, if low affiliation is considered threatening, then worrying to maintain 
low valence may help the individual protect themselves from such anticipated negative 
consequences, regardless if the other person’s behavior is affiliative or distancing.  
Clinical researchers have increasingly been integrating into GAD treatment a focus on 
interpersonal behaviors (e.g., Erickson, Newman, & McGuire, 2014). Therefore, the present 
results hold clinical implications for individuals with GAD symptoms as well as regarding 
appraisals of interpersonal threats. Compared to those participants who perceived more overall 
immoral behavior, the individuals with high GAD symptoms who perceived more instances of 
moral behavior reported experiencing higher valence in social interactions. Therefore, a possible 
therapeutic intervention may be to help clients with GAD symptoms practice noticing the 
morality of others’ behaviors. Such an intervention may consist of a mindfulness practice, such 
as to mindfully notice others’ benevolent intentions underlying their behaviors. Alternatively, the 
intervention may be a cognitive behavioral therapy (Beck, 2011) intervention to think of 




For clients regardless of GAD status, when therapists are exploring a client’s experience 
of threatening interpersonal interactions, the therapist may assess whether the perceived 
interpersonal behavior was predominantly submissive, cold, or immoral. Therapists may help 
them navigating interpersonal groups to maximize the affiliative and moral individuals they 
surround themselves with and decrease time spent with individuals who engage in cold and 
immoral behaviors. Based on the present results, the expected effects would be an increase in 
affective valence. Similarly, therapists may examine whether their clients behave interpersonally 
in ways that perpetuate cold and immoral behaviors from others during social interactions. This 
may contribute to the maintenance of negative affect. Additionally, perhaps social shame may be 
a treatment target, particularly when interacting with individuals who are perceived as more 
dominant that oneself. Acceptance-based strategies (e.g., Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 2012) may 
improve perceived control and tolerance of shame within interactions with a dominant social 
partner.  
If high-GAD individuals avoid anxiety by appraising cold, immoral, and neutral behavior 
instead as affiliative and moral, then therapists may help their clients by increasing acceptance of 
the anxiety and uncertainty that may arise from objectively appraising others’ behavior as cold, 
immoral, or neutral. Such a pattern may necessitate identifying the underlying beliefs that keep 
anxiety and uncertainty so aversive. An intervention may be to help individuals with GAD 
symptoms improve the objectivity of their appraisals of others’ interpersonal behaviors.  
Therapists must simultaneously be wary of the client resorting to anxiety avoidance 
strategies, namely reassurance-seeking. This may be common among worriers when they 
disclose their worries to others, they may fail to address their core fear thus continuing to spark 




teach GAD clients how to seek social support from others that does not perpetuate experiential 
avoidance and maintain their worry over time.  
Limitations and Future Research 
 There are several limitations of the present research that deserve mentioning. The present 
sample consisted entirely of college undergraduates, many whom were Caucasian and female. In 
addition, the sample was recruited from a private, religious university. These features may limit 
the generalizability of the present results. In addition, this may have resulted recruiting 
participants with a heightened sensitivity to appraisals of moral behavior. In contrast, individuals 
from a secular university or from the community may not show such a sensitivity to perceiving 
the morality of interpersonal behavior. However, prior research and theory (e.g., Goodwin et al., 
2014; Pizarro et al., 2011) conceptualized the moral dimension in way that implies most people, 
regardless of religious affiliation, would be sensitive to the morality of interpersonal behavior. 
Regardless, replication of the study is warranted with other samples from different social 
contexts to identify differential sensitivity to the perceived morality of interpersonal behavior.  
Participants completed Likert scales rating the quality of other peoples’ behaviors rather 
than choosing concrete categories of behaviors. This was done to flexibly assess the IPC 
dimensions without a-priori assuming which specific behaviors participants would constitute as 
belonging in each category. Furthermore, the Likert scales permitted greater variance given their 
use as continuous – rather than categorical – predictor variables. Another limitation is that the 
social perceptions ratings were coarsely-grained compared to the affect grid dimensions. This 
may have reduced variability and suppressed effects. However, given that effects and 




Notwithstanding, future research should measure social perceptions and affect ratings using the 
same scaling.  
There were several limitations regarding the daily diary procedure that are worth noting. 
First, surveys asked participants to self-report on a recent interpersonal interaction, but my 
research team did not assess the amount of time that had elapsed between the interaction and 
completion of a given survey. Furthermore, there was no time-out procedure to limit survey 
completion times. Even though surveys were sent to participants on a consistent schedule, 
participants did not complete surveys according to that schedule. For instance, in some cases 
participants completed multiple days’ worth of surveys in a single day. This was due in part 
because of our choice to send links to the surveys via email (or text if participants requested), 
which may have taken participants longer to receive than would a text message. This was a 
financial constraint because my team had access to Qualtrics, and we did not appropriate funding 
to subscribe to a mobile Ecological Momentary Assessment app or pay to have an app developed 
for the purposes of this study. Consequently, the data may be subjected to an unknown degree of 
recall bias (Singh & Björling, 2019). Furthermore, this variability in survey completion times 
prevented me from testing hypotheses regarding lagged time effects, as the amount of time 
elapsed between each survey varied considerably, both between and within participants.  
One limitation to the statistical interpretation of the results is that I did not specify a 
relationship between arousal and valence in analyses (i.e., covariance). Instead, the two 
components of the affect grid were tested separately, which limits our understanding of the 
relationship between the two. Perhaps an alternative analytic method (e.g., structural equation 




In addition, the hypothesized models assumed that perceptions of behavior preceded 
affective responses, when in fact the causal relationship may have flowed in the reverse 
direction. Considerable research has indeed shown that an individual’s affective state influences 
their appraisals of a situation (e.g., Lynn, Zhang, & Barrett, 2012). As such, all the effects of 
daily diary variables may be interpreted in the opposite direction, in that arousal and valence 
predicted perceptions of dominant, cold, and immoral behavior across interactions. Therefore, 
future experimental research is needed to support the hypothesized effects that perceptions of 
behavior resulted in changes in arousal and valence.  
Another limitation to the results was that some of the effect sizes fell below the suggested 
MDESs (see Arend & Schafer, 2019). Thus, it is possible that the present study did not have 
sufficient power to detect all of the hypothesized effects, resulting in possible Type II error. 
Furthermore, some of the present study’s significant effects also fell below the MDES, thus 
risking Type I error. Specifically, the direct effects of GAD predicting perceived cold behavior 
and perceived immoral behavior were too small at the study’s level of power, and thus should be 
interpreted with caution. Additionally, interaction effects such as GAD symptoms moderating 
within-person perceived cold behavior predicting arousal was not significant, and it also fell 
below the MDES, suggesting that the present study was underpowered to accurately detect this 
effect. However, most of the remaining effects exceeded the MDES, indicating that the study 
was sufficiently powered to test most of the hypotheses. 
Strengths of the present study include a moderately large sample size (N = 161) and 
participants completed a large average number of surveys (28.16), which facilitated substantial 
power for detecting hypothesized effects. I used well-validated, widely-used instruments for 




their state affect on x and y coordinates – rather than selecting one of 81 boxes in a 9 x 9 grid – 
permitted greater variability in the data. In addition, GAD symptom level was treated as a 
continuous variable, whereas other studies with similar aims – the effects of psychopathology on 
state-level interpersonal interactions – have treated a trait variable of interest as a dichotomous 
variable, comparing effects between participants with and without a diagnosis (Sadikaj, 
Moskowitz, Russell, Zuroff, & Paris, 2013; Scott et al., 2017; Wright et al., 2017). However, the 
procedure used in the present study increased variability, therefore improving power and 
maximized the generalizability of results to the entire spectrum of worriers rather than only to 
individuals with or without GAD. 
Conclusion 
 The present study expands upon the literature regarding interpersonal behaviors, state 
affect, and worry. This is the first known study to conceptualize interpersonal threats according 
to three interpersonal dimensions, the two existing dimensions of the interpersonal circumplex 
(dominance and affiliation) and a theorized third dimension (morality). Moreover, the results 
partially supported the conceptualization of IPC behaviors as interpersonal threats, namely that 
cold and immoral behaviors were shown to correspond with ratings of increased arousal and 
decreased valence. However, the results showed that perceiving dominant behavior predicted 
lower arousal and valence, which suggests that participants may have experienced a different 
emotional response, such as shame, boredom, or humility. Furthermore, this study provided 
support for the independence of the affiliation and morality dimensions. 
  This study is one of the few to examine GAD symptoms within daily, naturalistic 
interactions. As such, the present results extend the understanding of how GAD symptoms 




as a way to ensure that any effects were not simply to do any form of negative emotionality. 
However, the findings supported the predominance of situational factors in predicting state 
affect, as GAD symptoms showed no effect on state affect when state social perceptions were in 
the model. GAD symptoms did influence between-person effects of social perceptions on 
affective valence, but only for the affiliation and morality dimensions. GAD symptoms buffered 
the effect of average perceived cold behaviors on valence and strengthened the effect of average 
perceived immoral behaviors on valence. Overall, this study offers a novel approach to 
researching interpersonal behaviors associated with GAD, through conceptualizing IPC 
behaviors according to interpersonal threats. Furthermore, it enhances our understanding of how 
GAD symptoms might interact with average social perceptions to maintain symptoms over time, 
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Table 1  





1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 Arousalb -11.12 (39.59) .12 -96 to 96 -       
2 Valenceb 29.53 (48.13) .13 -95 to 96a .03 -      
3 Oth Domd .28 (.90) .13 -2 to 2 -.05 -.09 -     
4 Oth Coldc -.84 (1.06) .14 -2 to 2      .27** -.43** -.15 -    
5 Oth Immorc -.60 (.99) .17 -2 to 2 .06 -.43** -.09 .63** -   
6 GAD-Q-IVe  6.16 (3.02) - 0 to 12 .08 -.07 .02 -.11 -.16* -  
7 CES-Df 20.30 (5.35) - 10 to 40     .25** -.07 -.04 .02 -.04 .59**   - 
8 Genderg - - - .04 .03 .01 -.08 -.03 .14h .08 
†p< .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; aThis range was from a 191x192 pixel rectangle in Qualtrics. b4533 surveys;  c4532 surveys; d4530 surveys; e161 participants;  f159 
participants completed the CES-D; gNot Female = 0 Females = 1; hExcluding the data of the two gender non-binary participants resulted in this correlation 







Frequencies of perceived interpersonal behaviors within each 




 Dominance Affiliation Morality 
High (1 or 2) 1,641 3,109 2,391 
Neutral (0) 2,231 858 1,658 
Low (-1 or 2) 658 565 483 
Note: Three surveys were missing ratings for dominance, two  
surveys were missing ratings for affiliation, and one survey was  















Unstandardized and standardized regression weights, standard errors, and confidence intervals for fixed effects & random intercept of GAD symptoms predicting each L1 variable, 




 Others’ Dominant Bx  Others’ Cold Bx  Others’ Immoral Bx  Arousal  Valence 
 b (SE) β 95% CI  b (SE) β 95% CI  b (SE) β 95% CI  b (SE) β 95% CI  b (SE) β 95% CI 
Fixed 
effects 
                   
Intercept .29 (03)*** - .23, .34  -.82 (.03)*** - -.89, -.76  -.60 (.03)*** - -.76, -.43  -11.15 
(1.18)*** 
- -13,48 -8.82  29.00 
(1.55)*** 
- 25.94, 32.06 
Dep Sxs -.004 (.01) -.03 -.02, .01  .01 (.01)† .07 -.002, .03  .01 (.01) .05 -.01, .03  .89 (.27)** .12 .34, 1.43  -.25 (.36) -.03 -.96, .47 
GAD Sxs .005 (.01) .02 -.02, .03  -.04 (.01)* -.10 -.06, -.01  -.03 (01)* -.10 -.06, -.01  -.42 (.50) -.03 -1.41, .57  .15 (.66) .01 -1.14, 1.45 
Random 
effects 
                   
 σ2 (SE)    σ2 (SE)    σ2 (SE)    σ2 (SE)    σ2 (SE)   
Random 
Intercept 





















Table 4   
MLM fixed unstandardized and standardized regression weights, standard error, t-values, p-values,  




                                              1                                              2 
 b (SE) β t p 95%CI  
[LL, UL] 
 b (SE) β t p 95%CI  
[LL, UL] 
Fixed Effects            
Intercept -3.85 (2.49) -.01a -1.57 .124 -8.76, 1.07  -3.29 (2.47) -.02a -1.33 .185 -8.17, 1.69 
Dep Sxs .76 (.26) .10 -.36 .004 .24, 1.28  .68 (.26) .09 2.62 .010 .17, 1.20 
GAD Sxs -.17 (.49) -.01 2.90 .719 -1.13, .78  -1.46 (.89) .00 -1.64 .103 -3.21, .30 
MP-D .26 (3.10) .00 .08 .934 -5.87, 6.39  .05 (3.15) .00 .02 .986 -6.17, 6.28 
MP-C 14.01 (3.33) .37 4.21 < .001 7.43, 20.58  14.28 (3.27) .38 4.37 < .001 7.83, 20.74 
MP-I -6.99 (3.30) -.17 -2.12 .036 -13.50, -.47  -5.72 (3.28) -.14 -1.74 .083 -12.21, .76 
PC-D -6.66 (.94) -.13 -7.06 < .001 -8.53, -4.80  -6.67 (.95) -.13 -7.05 < .001 -8.54, -4.80 
PC-C 5.20 (.90) .12 5.76 < .001 3.42, 6.98  5.21 (.90) .12 5.78 < .001 3.43, 7.00 
PC-I 2.82 (1.06) .06 2.66 .009 .73, 4.92  2.84 (1.06) .06 2.69 .008 .75, 4.93 
MP-D * GAD -   -   -.30 (1.04) -.02 -.29 .776 -2.34, 1.75 
MP-C * GAD -   -   -.68 (1.12) -.05 -.61 .545 -2.96, 1.53 
MP-I * GAD -   -   -1.64 (1.00) -.12 -1.63 .104 -3.62, .34 
PC-D * GAD -   -   -.05 (.31) -.01 -.15 .881 -.67, .57 
PC-C * GAD -   -   .09 (.30) -.00 .29 .774 -.51, .69 
PC-I * GAD -   -   -.37 (.36) -.02 -1.03 .303 -1.08, .34 
AIC 44932.86      44938.40     
Note: Statistically significant results are presented in bold. PC = person-centered; Dep = depression; GAD = Generalized Anxiety Disorder; Sxs = 
symptoms. MP = mean perceived; PC = person-centered; D = dominant behavior; C = cold behavior; I = immoral behavior; AIC = Akaike’s 







Table 5  
MLM fixed unstandardized and standardized regression weights, standard error, t-values, p-values, and confidence intervals in blocks 1  




 1  2 
 b (SE) β t p 95%CI  
[LL, UL] 
 b (SE) β t p 95%CI  
[LL, UL] 
Fixed Effects            
Intercept 12.54 (2.90) -.01a 4.32 < .001 6.80, 18.28  12.53 (2.84) -.01a 4.42 < .001 6.93, 18.13 
Dep Sxs .03 (.31) .00 .10 .921 -.58, .64  .06 (.30) .01 .19 .849 -.54,.65 
GAD Sxs -.79 (.57) -.05 -1.40 .165 -1.91, .33  .33 (1.02) -.06 .32 .748 -1.69, 2.34 
MP-D -8.02 (3.62) -.15 -2.22 .028 -15.16, -.88  -7.91 (3.61) -.15 -2.19 .030 -15.04, -.78 
MP-C -12.53 (3.88) -.27 -3.23 .001 -20.19, -4.88  -12.73 (3.75) -.27 -3.40 .001 -20.13, -5.33 
MP-I -14.10 (3.85) -.29 -3.67 < .001 -21.70, -6.51  -13.81 (3.77) -.29 -3.67 < .001 -21.25, -6.38 
PC-D -5.49 (.84) -.09 -6.53 < .001 -7.16, -3.83  -5.48 (.84) -.09 -6.48 < .001 -7.15, -3.80 
PC-C -14.01 (.89) -.27 -15.82 < .001 -15.76, -12.26  -13.99 (.88) -.27 -15.82 < .001 -15.73, -12.24 
PC-I -19.42 (.94) -.35 -20.56 < .001 -21.29, -17.56  -19.43 (.94) -.35 -20.78 < .001 -21.27, -17.58 
MP-D * GAD - - - - -  .23 (1.19) .01 .19 .849 -2.12, 2.57 
MP-C * GAD - - - - -  3.84 (1.28) .25 3.00 .003 1.31, 6.38 
MP-I * GAD - - - - -  -3.17 (1.15) -.19 -2.76 .006 -5.43, -.90 
PC-D * GAD - - - - -  -.19 (.28) -.01 -.67 .503 -.74, .37 
PC-C * GAD - - - - -  .30 (.30) .01 1.00 .320 -.29, .88 
PC-I * GAD - - - - -  -.47 (.32) -.03 -1.49 .139 -1.10, .16 
AIC 44423.578      44421.864     
Note: Statistically significant results are presented in bold. PC = person-centered; Dep = depression; GAD = Generalized Anxiety Disorder; Sxs = symptoms. 
MP = mean perceived; PC = person-centered; D = dominant behavior; C = cold behavior; I = immoral behavior; AIC = Akaike’s Information Criterion. anon-
signitificant. 
